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l .  INTRODUCIION 
Legal scholars g<"JWrally assume that law should st ri,·e towards 
coherence.' The ideal of coherence is regarded as partintlarly important in 
Lhe comext of criminal sanctions, where it is argued that "[d]isparity [in 
semencing] is a manifest form of injustice, which may bring a entencing 
system into public disrepute."2 This ideal has had many consequences, 
ranging from the drafting of the U.S. sentencing guidelin<"s in the 1970 tO 
Lhe current effon Lo limirjur-y discretion over punitive damage� in ton law 
(which is gaining momentum both among scholars and in rhe courts) .:1 
This Article invesLigates coherence within an efficit-Jlc:' framework. 
Using insights from behavioral economics and a simple experiment, we 
conclude that predictabiliry in punishment may be inefficient. In keeping 
with Bentham ·s principle of frugality-the principle that a sanction should 
be as small as necessary w achieve its goals-we argut- that uncertain 
anctions may be preferable on efficiency grounds because: they achieve 
more deterrence than certain sancLions of the same exp<>Ct<"d \alue. As we 
acknowledge, this argumem is two-edged. On the one hancl, it suggests rhat 
there may be substantial benefits to uncertainry in sanctioning. On the other 
hand, the serious objections to uncertainty in sanctioning-o�jenions which 
we acknowledge and explore-also suggest important limits on efficiency as 
a guide in designing legal wks governing deterrence. 
Traditionally und<"rstood, legislaLOrs and policy maJ...er� ha'<' rwo ways to 
increase' the deterrence of \vrongful activity: increasing the siztJ of the 
sancrion imposed or increasing the probability of deLeCLion. In combination. 
these nvo variables constitut<' rhe expected sanction. and tht' expened 
sannion i what determines the rate of crime or wrongful beha,·ior.� Some 
law ancl economics �cholars have pointed out the rek\'anrc of a third 
,·ariable, attitudes wward risk, explaining that the cleterrent effcn of a 
sanction depends on the subjective value of the sanction ro the individual in 
question.'' This subjccti,·e value depends nor only on rJ1e si7e and probabiliry 
I. ,\,,,, Cass R. Sunstrlll c:t al.. J>H'dlrtab�, lnrolu•rt nt.Jud1f11111/ts. !'l.J S 1.". 1.. R�.\. I I !i;{. I I :>4 
(�00�). 
2. .\1'1• Alldrt"w Asltw<>1th, Four ·/ninuqru·� fin Rl'lftiiiiiJ!: .\1"11/l'llft' I>Hjmrtl_). 111 PRt:-..t.ll'l.l·.n 
<;1:.1\"1 �.:"WI:-\t.: RL-\[JI:-\(:� 0'-. ·IIIHlRY :\:--Jll Pouc:y '227. 'l.:�ti (Andn·,,· \'qn HtrM h & .A.ndrt"\\ 
As]l\,·onh t>ds., Jq�9). 
�- .\rr Stall"" F<•rm �1ut. Aut<>. In�. Cu., .. < :amplwll. 5:1x l .�. 40� ('21111:-'.) 1 ••'H'NII).( :.�ward 
of punitive d;uaagc.s undt'J the Due l'mn·s� t:lause ot llw FouJl<'t"nth Atnc·JJdnwnt) . . \t•t•!(t•nt•rti/1.' 
C.\S') R. SL "!-o'll,JN �-,AI... Pl.'ITI\ 1·. D·\\1.·\(,J-.' !2001). 
-1. Thi� is the oh�crvatt<�l\ of C.try Bt'ck.-t in his ''·min.-� I ;u ttdt", < ;:n' S. lk< kt'J. C.r71111' 1111tf 
1'11111\ltmt•lll. 1\nJ:nmuu/11 tlf1/ll•lllrh, 71i J. 1'01 1-.1.01>.. Hi�. 177 ( I!J6X). 
�,. .\1'1' :\. !'vlitchell Pohnsk\ & Steq·n Sh.t,·<-11. 'Jiw Ojlllmnl Frrulmff /Jt-1,,.,." th. l'mlmlnitt_y tmd 
Mll.l,rnitutl•• nf l·illl''· fi9 A�l. Ft.O,_ Rl·\ XXII. XXO-i{l ( 1!17'1) fk.-1-t•t < nn�i<kn·cl .utiturlt"' l<l\\�1rrl 
•·il-k .-�� 1\'1•11. b111 in lt"'iS ckt..td .. .'il't·lkc kt-1. wjnn ll<llr ·1. a1 17X 
-lAG 89 10\ \·�-� LAW HE\ Tt;w l�OO·ll 
of a c.;anni(lll. but also on an individual'c.; <.t\'('r:->ion to ri ·k and discount rat(· 
(i.e .. the relative> value assigned to initial and subsequent sanction units).'' 
vVe extend this attention to risk aversion by incorporating insightc.; from 
behavioral analysi rt'garding the effect of uncertainty in decision-making. 
We learn from and extend the re ults obtained in research on taxpayer 
compliance7 to begin to develop a more general understanding of the role 
of unc<->nainry in deten;ng violations of legal norms. 
Pan fl of this Article reports the results of a decision-making 
experiment that explored how uncertain tv regarding the size of a tine and 
uncertainty regarding the probability of detection affect the choice to violate 
a norm. ln the experiment, participants were asked to decide whether to 
take an anion that would result in a monetary payoff but would expose Lhem 
to a risk of being caught and required w pay a fine. The participant-; were 
given real money and assessed real fines, in amounts that varied according 
w their derisions. Over the course of the experiment, we varied the cenainty 
of the information provided to the panicipants about the size of the fine 
and the chances of being caught, while holcting constant the expected value 
of the- s,tncrion and the average probability of being caught. In general, the 
greater tht" uncertaincy regat·ding the size of the fine or the chance of being 
caughL the more unlikely participants were to take the action. This result is 
ttot an ob,·ious one. Indeed, one of us predicted on the basis of existing 
literawre on uncenaimy that individuals would prefer uncertain sanctions 
to ccnain sanctions.� Hence, after describing these results, Pan [f reconciles 
these rt>�ults with prior behavioral decision research. 
While certainly preliminary and explorawry. the experiment advanced 
the \'erY limited prior behavioral decision research on compliance with 
norms in l\vo ways: by framing the decision in a manner that allows the 
results 10 be generalized w a wider array of situations and by using monetary 
rewards and punishments to make the decision more realistic. Although any 
conclu:-;ions drawn from this research must be quite tentative, the t·e·ults 
ti. ·'"'' Polinsky & Shavell, suprn note 5. at Kt\0-H I: IN' aLsn A. Mitchell Polinsky & Sten�n 
Shan-11. 011 tlu• Dtsulllity and Oitcounting of lmprisonmPI/l and the Them)' of Detrnn1CI', 2R .J. LEGAl. 
STL 11. I . 1-I :� ( 1 999) . 
7. 'in• g••,wmllyje!T T. Casey &John T. 'clwlz. 11rymul Oeterrmrr RPitm•ioml [)('(iH/JII T/tPOI)' 
awl I II\ ( :nmplin.llrl'. 25 L-\\\' &: Soc·y REV. 2 1  ( 19�J 1 )  (hereinafter flf)'flllfl DPLm'l'llrPj: JeiT T. 
Ca'-t'\ .'\: lohn T. Schol1., Boundary EJjPctt of \'rtguP Rtsk lnjimmtlion m1 Taxpayer Dl'riswns. ;,() 
ORe\' 11. \ f!O'\AI. 13EH:\\. & 1 -1  L':-1. DECISIOI' PRo<.t:.SSES 360 ( 1991) I hereinafler Roundrm 
1-:jft•tt.tl. ·''''' (l/.1n Dipanker Ghosh & Terry L. Crain, Stntrt.url' of Unrrrtainty and Duiston Mak111g: :\n 
J·.xfll'tllltr•ttal lm•£•rtigation, 24 DECISION Set. 789. 790 (l\>93): Machael 'vV. Spicer &: J Everett 
J'lwm,L�. -\witt J->mbabilitil'5 and the Tax };umwn Uwmcm: rln E...-prrimentttl Af>IJrondt. 2 J. Eco'l. 
PSY<.tl<ll .. :i·�l. 243-44 ( 1 982). 
� \'p,. :\lon Harcl &: U7.i Segal. Cmninal Law mul 81'/tavinmll.aw and Ernnomict: Obst>runtifll l 
1111 lfu• '''J!fl'r/NI Roll' of Uncatailll)' in 01'tming Crimt•, 1-2 A:-.t. L. EC:Oi'-'. RE\'. 276, l!80 ( 1 999) 
(cla-LII,�III� criminals' preference for an uncertain -;entence). 
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suggest that uncertainly with regard to either the size of the sanction or the 
probability of detection i ncrcases deterrence, ceteris pmibus. 
With regard w ct-iminal law, research of this sort may provide a reason 
to question the deterrent ,·alue of detet·minate sentencing. With regard to 
tort law, such research suggests for example that ton reform efforts aimed at 
making non-economic and pun1uve damages more predictable may 
decrease the deterrent effect of tort law (even if the average size of the 
damages was to remain constant). l n both fields, this research suggests that 
policymakers may be able 10 increase deterrence by manipulating the 
uncenainty regarding probabilicy of detection. Examples or policies directed 
at uncertainty in detection include publicizing short-term, intensive, random 
swps for drunk driving, random audits for securities fraud, or pet-iodic, 
intensive review of parient records for medical malpraC(ice. As we will 
explain, it is this finding regarding the deterrence value of uncertainty with 
respect to the probabilit)' of detection that is most inconsistent with 
traditional expected utility analysis (and, thus, demonstrates most 
persuasively the "value added" of a behavioral approach).'' 
Part 111 of this Anicl<" explores the treatment of uncenainty in criminal 
and tort law. We begin by pointing out that the legal system does not 
consistently pursue predictability in sanctioning. Consider the following two 
hypothetical situatiolls. In the first situation, two individuals commit 
identical wrongs and both are caught. The first is assessed a fiJ1e or damages 
of $10.000, while the second is assessed a fine or damages of $5000. If the 
disparity between rh<! e two individuals is due only to chance (for example, a 
sentencing lottery conducted after the two criminal were caught), w ir 
provides cause for concern. The person who received the harsher sanction 
has a legitimate moral, and perhaps even legal, complaint: "\Nhy was 1 
punished more harshly than she \vas?"11 
Jn the seco11d illlation, t'''O individuals commit identical wrongs but 
face different probabilities of detection. The difference in the probability of 
detection follows from a policy, endorsed by police officers, of thoroughly 
investigating 50% of the' reported oimes (chosen randomly), while 
conducting only a curson· investigation of the other haJf. As a result of this 
"detecrion lottery." the fir t individual has a 10% chance of being caught 
9 Sn' injlnlext acromp;1min):i notes 59-61. 
W. Th(· idea of a �enrennng lonen• is botTo\\·ed !rom Dand 1.<:'\,'t�. Th1· Punilhlll£'111 Thra 
Lt•twe� .\tnn,,tftlllf;to Cltwtrl'. IX PI Ill. 8.: Pl·B. AFF. 53. 58-62 ( 1 989). 
I 1. In l9R2. ajnclge- in :--it''' York \.itv Oipped a com tO deLennitw \d1t'ther to st·ntence an 
individual to tl,·cnl� 01 thirn d,tv' in jail. The public was outraged, and lht· judge ''-a� censured. 
E.R. Shipp. Fmsl Is Brnn'tl jmm I:11Pr Bnng Srw J'ork jwigP, !'i.Y. Tl�tF.S. Ap1. I. 19R:�. at B3 S1'1' 
judith Resnick. PrPthuiing.-'lpfmt!l. 70 CoR-.:ELL L. Rl::\·. 603,611,615 (19�5) (discussing Lhe Ne,,· 
York mcirk•nt ;md de�cnbu1g coin flipping as an ineiTenive tool fmjndtc..tal <ieciston making). 
Tht- ;ln·r�•on to S<'tHenring lniiCrtt'S is pan of a brnadc->r phenomenon. name-ly the- a1·er�ion w 
luck tn c nm11t:1l l<t\\· .\1•r Omn l><'n h:li1:1r 8.: Alon Hart'l. ·n11 J·;lfmnmj,·, o{ thl' l.m•• tl{ Cmninn/ 
Altt'fii/Jl' ·I 1'1111111 r:,,ll/m•d P!'njlnrn'''· I·F> l' P.·\. 1.. RF\' 1!19. :��n n ..J\1 1 1\l�ll;l. 
-14H H9 /OH:-1 /.,I \I' NF\'/t•;\1' r2o(H 1 
and punished while rile o.;c:>cond has only a:)'}(, dta••<-c. Our inruirio11 i� that 
the disparit�· i11 the l ikelihood of detection bet\\'ecn the� two cri n 1inal<; does 
not raise the scune ITlOral resemment as rhe> dispari£\ in the size or the 
sanction. fhe moral cnnct'rn of the person \dw <Lsks ... \1\'h�· me?'' St-'ems 
compelling in the case of a sentencing loll<"•"· bllr not in the ca�e of a 
detection Iotter)··':! A number of well-esrahlishecl legal doctrines and 
institutional practices in hoth the criminal and tort fields ref1ect these 
differences in moral intuition.1:1 
After describing some of these docu·ine. and practice , Pan III goes on 
LO explore how cri minal law and tort law treat uncenainty. as well as ways in 
which uncertainty can be manipulated-withcHlt \·iolating foundational 
doctrinal principles-even in contexts in \vhich it is (X'I'Ceived as 
undesirable. Examples of doctrines and institutional practices that create 
uncertainty ir1 the criminal law field include prosecuto•ial dio.;cretion tO 
charge crimes up or down, sanctions tha t vary accurcling to the results of the 
crime, and the Pinknton rule (pursuant to which members of conspiracies 
are liable for· the acts or others). Examples in the torr law field include the 
practice of seuing damages according to the harm to the victim, the 
"randomizing'' effect of relying on private panics to enforce the law, and the 
ability of liability insurance to reduce or magnirv the uncertainty in ton 
sanction·. These example are in addition to the \·e•-y substantial eli ·cretion 
granted to criminal and civil enfo•-cerncrn bodie-s regarding the allocation of 
resources to the detection and prosecution of criminal and civil wrongs. 
Part IV of this Article addresses a number of important potential 
objections to manipulating uncertainr:y w optimize cteterrence. We examine 
objections based on mo•-ality, cost, effectiveness, and the potential risks of 
over- and under-deterrence, in addition ro o�jcnious based on research 
sho\ving that uncertainty has differenrial dfens on people according to their 
aversion to risk. While all of these oqjenions raise important qualifications 
that may limit the practical application of our analysis iu certain situations, 
none fundamentally undercuts our pn�jen. Indeed, even i f  all of the 
objections were otherwise insurmountable. our· rest·an:h would nevertheless 
suggest that policy makers could accomplish greate•· deterrence by focusing 
public attention on already existing and high tv ttncenain aspects of civil and 
criminal sanctioning. 
The prima•y purpose of this Article is not to establish, once and for all, 
that increasi11g uncertainty with resp<>ct w th<:- -;izc of the sa11ction and the 
probability of detection is desirable, or n·en the more modest goal that 
increasing uncertainty is necessarily de irable from an efficiency-based 
perspective. Instead, our aim is to expand the traditional paradigm beyond 
12. _<.;,.,, l-Iard & St"gal, wpm note R at 277. Tlw lt-g-ituu;llt' moral concern ol the viCLims or 
tile 1wo crinH::.. however, seems likelr to be quilt: difkn--ul 
13. SPI' dbcus.,inn wfm Pans lll.:-\.1-2. Ill. B. I-�-
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rhe focus on the size of the sannion and the probability of detection as the 
means by which law can deter wrongful behavior. There is an additional 
imponant tool at the disposal of policy makers and legislators: the power to 
manipulate the certainty of rhc size of sa11ctions and the certainty of the 
probability of their imposition. 
JI. AN EXPERit-IE. ;TALJ:\.1\'ESTICATTON OF THE 
DETERRE. T EFFECTS OFU CERTAINTY 
This part de CJ;bes and presentS the resultS of an experiment 
conducted in order to investigate the effectS of uncertainty. Section A 
provides the theoretical foundarions for the experiment, explaining the 
differenr meanings of uncenainty and the ways in which manipulating 
uncertainty could promote deterrence. Section B sketches in more detail the 
purposes of the experiment as well as i[s limitations. Section C describes the 
expe1·iment itSelf. Section D prt"sents the results. 
A. THJ:'OJU:TI( A"'· Fm·.,-oA ·noNs 
\t\1ithin an efficiency framework. individuals comply with legal norms 
based on an evaluation, implicit or orherwise, of the costs and benefitS of 
compliance. One of the benefits of compliance with legal norrns is avoiding 
the legal sanctions that follow from Yiolation of those norms. Hence, actors 
make at least an implicitjudgrne111 regarding (a) the probability that norm­
,·iolating behavior will be cletc:ete.d and (b) the nature (or the size) of the 
sanction that will be impo ed in the cvem of detection. Becau c even the 
best informed, utilil)· maximi'l..ing actor unlikely to have precise 
information about either the probahility of detection or the size of the 
sanction, such judgments arc neces arily made under conditions of 
unccrtaimy. Accordingly, a realistic account of the deterrent effeCL of legal 
norms should address the- effect of uncertainty both with respect to the 
nature and size of legal sanctions and with respecr to the probability of 
detection on decision-making.•·• 
I I. 13eh;n·lortll <kci�ion t·ese;.u r h Ita� alri'<Hh- been lLS.Cd in nume:-n.>t1� art>as of l<n" w 
d("scribe how mrli\·icluals make den�ion' nnde:-1 conrliuon� of uncen.aintr as \,·e)] <�<> to :.nggc>sl 
ho" IC!ftll rule, shoulrl bt arljuslt•d 1�1 llgh1 ol •hi!> rt'st'arc-h. R<·sc-ardwrs han· e-xamined llw 
beh;t\·ior of j 1tries, ,,.,. F:ch,·ard .J. �It C,tf!en C"l .Jl .. l·imnmg thr jur:': <-=o�nlliw fJH.\fJPrlivr•\ m1 Pain 
a1 t/Sujjt•m1gAwarrkKl VA. 1.. R.n. 1:1-ll Cl�l�l:l); \l't'fl lt,puniliw damagl::.alllclt"s 111ji-o nole:- :?1. 
1h..- beh:1\·i01 ot judgn. '�'�' gt•nrra{/, ( .hri� ( ·lllhri�· . .Jdlrt'v J. Rachlin�ki & Andre\,. J. \'\"isu;ch. 
llllulr tlzr fudmal ,\}niCI. XI) (.<lR:'\�11 1.. Rl·.\. 777 (2()01). anct IlK· beha\·ior nl lawv�·rs and 
li1igan1s. ·"'" w·w•rn/1\ Chri� Cnlhrir·. ht1 11 11p: hwololt\ l.iltKflliow A /\yrftologtral Tht•un. 1)7 l". CHI. 
1.. Rl·.\. 163 (20tH I): Rw .. ,e II 1-i.orobkin. :\ 'fnmlit/11' a//(/ St•/1/nw•lll. �X COR!'. I·. !.I 1.. Rl \". I 1?00�): 
Rt•��..-11 1-i.orobku' & C:lub c;uthric. l'nrlmlo.I!J. l·.,mlrmlin. and St•lf/1'1111'11 : .'\ :\"no /.,loll rJt t/11 ff"l'" of 
tlu· J.awr"r· 7fi T�:-. I. Rl· \·. 77 ( 19�)/\. Yt·l. �urprbingh, thi� r<-�carrh ha� IHH \{"1 ,·x.mlitwcl hO\'' 
\llll("r!:tilll\ lllflllt"ll< 1·� lht" cJeH'I"I<'Itl dJn·l� of CTiminaJ !>.l11C"Ii<lll'. Ill"< h-iJ !"t'lllt"dit·:-. rJw ,oJ1· 
.-!pp.m::nt c·xc epnon� .tr<' in dw lidd .. t l.t:-pa\<"1 <'<llnpliant •.. Sn• l iard & Sq�<JL '11/lltl llt>lt" H. al 
'271'-77. Fot It'\ it·\\·, ol llw pn1<"1111.tl .tppli.-;Hi•lll:- of llt"h;l\ i•>ral ch·d,l<>ll tt•M·;H t h In l:t\' .tnd 
t•c •>ll<llnH .ln,th'''· ""'' ��·no•r.dh ( In j,, int• jolh <"I .d .. .-1 Ut•htr;•itmd. ljJfJIYII/1 h '''I au• 1 11rl 1-."11111111 1 1"\. 
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\t\'ltat it means for the \ I U  of a sanction w be 111ore- or If'. s ccnain is 
intuitively clear and, thus, needs liule explanation. A fixed fine fur a given 
\vrong is more ccnain than a fine in an amount that depends on the flip of a 
fai r  coin. Similarly, a fine in an amount based on the flip of a fair coin is 
more cenain than a fine in an amount that depend· on one or more factors 
that are les · predictable than rhe flip of a fair coin. such as a fine that 
depends on the temperawre next week. 
Cenainry in detection is more complicated. I n  this regard we need to 
make a crucial distinction between the probalnlil)' of rletertion and the JYrecision 
with which individuals arc able to know rhe probabiliry of detection. In 
everyday speech. the- concept of certainty in detection could refer to both. 
For example, it would be enrirely reasonable to say rhat one kind of crime, 
which is 50% more likeLy to be detected than another, is moTe rr>rtain to be 
detected. 
This "probabil ity of detection" aspen of certainty, however, is not what 
concerns us here. l n  tead, we are investigating the deterrent effect of 
varying information about the precision of the probability of detection. In 
order not to confound tht> effects of "l ikelihood" and ·'precision,'' our 
experimem holds constant the overall probability of detection (at least 
i n  ofar as that is possible) .  The experiment varies, however, the precision 
with which panicipanL<; are able to know the probabiliry of detecLion. For 
example, the experiment compare decisions in situations in wh ich there is 
a defined risk of 30% of being fined to decisions in situations in which there 
are equal chances that the probability of being fined will be either 20% or 
40%. Similarly, the experiment compares decisions in situations in which 
there is a defined risk of go% of being fined to decision· in situations in 
\vhich the probability of being fined is either 20% or 40% and there is no 
information regarding the- chances of the probabi lity being one or the 
other. The situations in which the probability of being fined can be either 
20% or 40% involve greater uncertaimy ( i n  the sense that interests us here) 
than the situation in which the probability is a definite 30%."; 
50 STA:-.i. L. REv. 1-17\ (19Y, ) . and Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen. l.aw rmd Belwuwral 
Sciena: Renwumg !he Harumnlity As�umptwn from Law and Economics, 88 C.:.\L. l.. RE\'. I 0:) I (2000). 
SeP alm Colin Camerer. fndu•idual Dmsmn Makwg, in HANDBOOK OF BEH:\\'IOR.Al. [C:O:>:O:-IIC'i: 
BEHAVIORAL DEC:ISIO,._ M.-\KING 3�7-676 (Stanley Kaish et al. eels .. 1991) (reviewing behavioral 
decision research): Da\1d Cohen and Jack L. KnetSch, judictal Choice and Dispanlies Between 
Mmsures of Economzr \ ·alue.s, 30 OS<:OODE HALL LJ. 737 ( 1992) (using behavioral decision 
research findings to explain a varietv of common law doctrines). 
15. From the perspective or expected utilicy theory, the distinction drawn here 111ay seem 
peculiar. Harel and Segal explain: 
Expected utilit� theorv does not distinguish between lotteries and compound 
loueries (lotteries in '"hic:h the outcomes themselves are lotteries).  For t':xamplt> if 
a person believes that thcrt: is an equal chance that the enforcement probability 
detection i� 5% a11d 13� . rht:n effeCLively she believes that the prohabilitv of 
detection is 10% (05 X 3t1: -r (} .. -, X 13%). 
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Some prior research in law and econom1cs has begun to explore the 
possibilir) that t-isk and uncertainty may be harnessed to enhance 
deterrence. For example, some tons theorists have raised the possibility that 
uncertainty could produce over-deterrence.111 Others have pointed out that 
attitudes towards risk are relevant to understanding the deterrent effects of 
increasing 1he probability of deteclion as compared to increasing the size of 
a sanction.1 7  Yet, more complex forms of uncertainty such as the concept of 
sentencing loueries. detection loneries, or even the relevance of ambiguity 
(i.e. uncertainty about the relative risk) 111 as a tool ro increase deterrence. 
have not been investigated either theoretically or empi1ically outside the 
field of taxpayer compliance.1!1 
Two areas in which this omission seem quite striking are determinate 
sentencing in criminal law and punitive damages in tOrt law. During the 
Hard & St'gal, wfJro nme 8, ;n 303-04. But the literawre on ambiguity suggests that very orten 
decision-makt>r:-. do not treat uncertain probabiliLie in tlw way tht>\" rreat knmm probabilities. 
Sl'e id. 
15.  (.[ .John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell. Somd]Jrrl' oj Uncn1anlty on ComplirmrPiuilh Legal 
Slandrm/.,. 70 \' \. 1 .. RE\". 965. 965 ( 1984) (aq�uing thai uncenaint,· over lc>gal standards will 
prochK.- _,u\r-optimal C'ompliancc because risk aver�<· individuals ,,-ill ·over-com ph'") .  Al1hou�h 
this <111d r.-lated later work, Richard Craswell & john E. Calfet:. UP1t'11'f'IICP and Ul/(l'/1ain Legal 
Standard.'. ':l j . l . .  Ec:ON. & 0Rt:. 279 ( 1986). arc: sign ificant <"XC<'ption� 10 the �cneT-al tendency tn 
ignoH' 1l11Ct'rtaimv, tlw unct>rtainry addn::�!>cd is that ol 1he cont.-nt of tht· lt•g<tl �tandard in 
que�tion. 11Ui The probability of detenion or size or ilw �ancl ion. Sll· Mark r. Grady . .-\ ,,·,,11. 
Po�1lm!' Fmnmnir Tlmny of Neglig;mre. 92 YALI· I.J. 799, X l  :� ( 1 983): Gillian Hadtleld. ll't•igh111g lhP 
l'nh11' of I ·fiJ!Itl'lll'\..1. A 11 f.(UIIOmir Pen11P.Cihw un Puri5iun in 1111• l.(lw. Ht CAl . L RF\". 541.  !">45 ( I  987): 
Jason S. john�wn, Bll_)l'�i(JII Fad-Finding and l:Jfirirtlf) .. Jillllll!'d (1// r:((}/10111iC Tht'OIY of l.wbility l'lllln 
llnn•t1ttlllf\. 61 S. CAL. L RE\'. 137, 1 4 1 ( 1 987). 
1 7. Sn'Htf>m note:. ?)-6. 
I R  Ambiguity rep�t·sents the lack o f  confidence, or l..tck or reliability or the mlormation 
one ha.' concerning the relative likelihood of en�n ts. Jr a person kno"·� that then: are fifty blatk 
balls <\lld tlftv "'hite balls 111 an um. a person knows thai the prol>abil i1y that a ,,·bite ball be 
picked up a1 random 1s :>0%. If a person knows Lhat there <lre 100 balls some of which a•·e whiw 
while 01heL� art' blatk. a person faces ambiguit,·-ambi�ully which is founded on ignorancl' 
wil11 respen to the relevam probabilities. Tht' da�sie<1l expennJelH sugges1ed bv Ellsberg 
illusu-ates llw concept of ambiguitY. Suppose an urn LOnlains nin<·t� balls. 1hin' of "·hich are 
known to be n:llo". while eath of the other sixtY is kncnm lO be ei1her blu.- or red, but 1lw 
exau compositivn ol these sixry ball� i� unknown. fn �·ach ot the llt'XI fow loneTies. ont> b,JII 
will be p11·kt'd a1 random, and the d<"cision mak�-r '"ill be paid au:orcling to its colot. Tlw Iolli 
lonerin arc: $100 il' wlltM. zero olhen,i�e; $100 il blue:'. 1.ero orhenvise: $100 if ''cllow or rc:d. 
zero if blue: and $100 if blue or red. z<·ru if ,.t'llo,,·. Elbberg suggc>sL' 1ha1 must deci�ion-makc>r� 
prc•fer tlw lirl>t louen LO the !>C'Cond. hut thc founh to tht third. This prefer<:'nre viola1e� 
standard pn>babili1y 1heory, sinre a dt>CT,i<m-makt·r "·hu p•d"t-r!> the first lc>tLt·r� to 1he second 
IT\eab 1hat h� belie,·e:- "yello,,··· l<> be molt' lik<·l� th.m .. blue ... On the tllh�·• hand. prc>ft>rrinll. 
the la�t Iutter; w tlw 1hird rt'Wab that. f01 thi' detl5inn make1 . .. bin�· 01 r\·d" i:-. m•m• likeh" Itt 
happen than .. vellow rH red."' ht'IH"e blllt' i� more l i!..eh than yellt)\\ . a contradiction. Ser Danid 
Ellshcrg. Rtlk, A mbiguif.\. and thf Sm•a!J.P :hiom.1. 75 Q. J. E( 1)1'. 6-U. 64�-6\J ( 1961 ). Thes<' and 
�imilar rt:�lliL� \\'Crc· rt•peated in n1an' <'XiwrinH:nts \"1'1 Kenneth R. �hrCri mnwn &: S1i!{ L11 'o11. 
( 'tilil) Tlmm· Axio111.1 \'n�ns .. flamdoXP\ . .. ill £Xt'H JFIJ  l"JII I IY 1 1\l'OTH F.<ii·.'> .-\'\:1) IHE AI I.-\1::­
P.-\KA!lt ):\ ::r�:>, ( Mauri< t: Alh1i� 8.: ()1.- H.tgt·n t'd:-. .. 1 �17!1). 
19 .\,.,. 111/lm lloll· 7 l lbling l lw t.t)..p.rwT t ompli.nu ,. hlc'T�Illli"l") 
I�O( H i  
fierce debates 0\·er :-.v utt·ncing guidelines. 1 1 0  serious considcracion appears 
w have been giv<'n ro tl tc possibility that increasing Ct'rtaimy migh t und('rcut 
deterre11ce.�" vVh i le this omission mav be under-;tanclable. givt'n rhat the 
se11tencing guidelines debate was conducted i n  nLOr<il rather than ecot tom ic 
rerms, the correspondi ng omission i n  discussions of· pun i tive damages is 
more difficult to explain. Qui te recent <;tudies on pu niti,·c damage<>, -;ome of 
which explicill} incorporate de-velopments in behm·ioral decision re-search, 
assume wi thou t questioning that Uitccnainr) i n  sa nct io ns is undesirable? 
This assu m ptio n is t:'specially troubling because the researchers ttse their 
tindings regarding llw u ncena i n ty ofjut)' decision making to argue for legal 
reforms limiting jll ;· discretion. Yet, the more foundational quest ion, 
whether unccnaimy is indeed undesirable (at least \,•ithin t he efllciency­
ba ed framework i n  which the research is couducted). typical!}' is disc ussed 
only summarily i n  an i n troducwry paragraph-a i->aragrapl t which reiterates 
the conviction that uncenaimy with respen to the size ol' punitive damages 
is both unj ust and i nefficienL.�� 
Efliciency considerations suggest that deterrence -;huuld be maximized 
for a give-n level of expenses. After all, the goal of cleLerrence is harm 
prevention; reduc i ng the cost of preventi n g hartn de-arly is desirable from 
�0. For ,t tlwrough '>lii"\'C)' of tlw hi�LOI")' of tht> �<'lllt>11CIIlg g111ckhnt:s, :-.n· K.\ rF <;·t ITI t &: 
.JOSE .-\. C:AC\R.\1'��'>. FI·-·\R OF J l"Dt:I:'\C:: St::;o..;TE!\:C:IN<: GL !DEI.I-.:F.� 1-.: Til� FEOERAL COLR IS 3'd-77 
( I  <)91)): C..\SSL-\ C. SPOIIN. How Do .JUD<.:f.S 0EC:IDE: TilE. SE.-\Rl I I  FOK F.-\IR:-.1�._-;s :\:-:D jLt<; !'ICE IN 
l'l''i!Stl\l�SI Y I9-6Y (200Y). The initial inspirmion of the !{Hicll'lilll'' "'l' a misuust ofjudicial 
discrctiun. At a latl'r stag(' the .sente:-ncing bill (thr bill \\'ltich t'St,th li�hes thl' sentencing 
guidelines) benun.: ··wugh<"r� un crime and its ··toHghnt's� .. \\';L, .th<• ju�tificcl in tenus of 
cltt...:rrtnr.:. Yet. the dime11sion which interestS us l ien:. ltanH·Iv tltt· tt·dnttion ot uncertainty 
and dispanrv . •  tppears 10 It ave been justified exclusively in tcnm. ul JU�tire rather than in terms 
or deterrence. 
2 1 .  St·1• Oantt·l Kahut:man et al., Shored Outl'(lgr and r:mtltr . \wnrtf, Tht· P.lyiholog:,· of Punitivt• 
/)awtfi/.'.1, Hi . J .  RISI' & U'iCERT.-\IN'fY 49. -19-50 ( 1 998): l);\\icl S1hkack t'l al.. Dl'fibr·mtiugAbolll 
Doflrtr\: Tlw Sn;Pril)' Shijl. 100 COLL'�I. l . .  RE\·. 1 1 39. 1 1 4�-��� (�OIItl): Cass R. Su11stein et al., 
A.l.fl'5.lin!{ Ptwtthw DamngPs (with Noll'S 011 Cof!:niLIIJII and Vnlunlu111 111 /.me). I 07 Y.\Lt:: LJ. 207 1 ,  
�075-76 ( 1 99�): W. Kip Viscusi. '1111• Soria/ C<w� of Puillllt'l' f>tllllllfit'' . \gauHI Curporfltirms in 
l�m•tmummtal ami S"fi'ty Tmts, �� CF.o. l.j. 285, 28H-9�l ( 199Hl. 
Y2. Thu�. for example, Stmstcin, Schkade &: Kallilt>tnan ,u glw that ·· ["'I hate\·e,· their 
ulrmtat<' purpn�t>s, the most widespread concern ahmu puniU\e dant.l).;l'S h;c. beett that they arc 
unpredictable. e\·etl ·out "f comro1.··· Sunstcin et at.. �upm •wte � I  . •  1t �U7;). They further argue 
that: 
l i l t is not hard to understand the widespread <.on\.'t'nt "·irlt ernnic pt•nitive 
d;una!{e aw,tnk If �•milarl)' siwatcd people-pl.dntiiT. . . tnd <lt-knclanL� alike-are 
lltll li'C<Itt::d 'imiJar)}'• crr<tliC awards arc llltfail . . . . [ ;\ js ,I pr<H I II ,tl lll<lltl'l, a risk Of 
extre11td� high awards is likely w produc...: cxce�si\l· < ,lllrion in risk-avt>rse 
ntanagers Jnd companies. Hence unpredictablt: awards ne<ll<' bvth unfairness and 
(on rea�on.tble ,tsstunption ) indlicicnc}, in a wa� Lllilt Ill <I\ m t•rdeter desi reable 
.tCli\ it\' 
SPe id. at 207!)-.77. On thr <>titer hand, Viscusi argues that ··puniti\·,. cl:unagc·s have no Si!{ltitlcant 
deterrent ellc:n'" (a ncl an: therefore inefficient) .  in �ig-nili(a 11 1  pan b.:caust' they are 
unprt>dittahh-. Sn· \'i,cn�i. ' 1 1/lfll note � I .  at 288-99. 
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an efficiency perspective. If li 1 1Certainty enhances the deterrent effect of a 
given set of legal rules a11c l  enforcement procedures. it may be possible to 
reduce the expected sannion. h'ithout decreasing itc; deterrent effects, by 
increasing the uncenai 1 1 l \ .  Uncertainty could be used to implemenr the 
principle of parsimony-the principle that sanctions should be as small as 
possible.:?:� For example. it individuals a1·e risk averse to punishment lonecies, 
then greater deterrcnc<:' could be obtained for the same sanctions, or 
alternatively the same- le,TI of deterrence could be obtained from smaller 
sanctions. 
This consideration set>ms e, ·idenr in criminal law. Jmposing sanctions i n  
criminal law i s  expen�: ;i \·t·. J r  t h e  average length o f  imprisonment can be 
reduced, this may sa''<" costs rhat would othenvise be inCLn-red by the state. 
These costs include the costs of n1aintaining prisons as well as the costs 
involved in  disrupting people 's lives (both those in prison and those outside 
who depend on them ) .  l n  addition. if the average size or fines can be 
reduced, this would lower rhe risk bearing costs of people potentially subject 
to Lhe fine.:!4 Alterna ti\'el�·. if tht a\'erage detection rate can be lowered. 
there will be savings in e r 1 l orcement costs. Similar considerations also apply 
to tort law. l n  the standard law and economic account, the primary purpose 
of ron damages i deterrence.:!·, If uncertainty serves as a ·'force multipl ier.·· 
then a smaller numbt"r of tort actions can p1·ovide the same deterrem etfecl 
as a larger numbe;-r of more certain actions, at a lower combined cost. 
Indeed, it may be that the widely condemned ''lotrery'' aspects of ron 
li tigation enforcernt>nt inn-case tlw deterrenL effects of a ton Ia''' rt>gtme 
. r � charactenzed by rampallt under-enrorcement.-
8. BEN·\ F/Uit:\1. 01-L'/S/0.\' RfSF.iii�C:H O.V UN<:F.Ifli\1,\TI. 
Prior behaYioral ckcision research suggests that uncenaimy ha 
predictable effects 011 (\t-cision-rnaking, depending on the \''ay that a choice 
is framed. For example. research panicipants in a wide variel)' of settings 
tend ro be risk avt"rse '�i th  respect to gains and risk seeking with respect to 
losses. Faced ,.vith a choin· benv-ecn a certain gain. say $5, ancl a 25�, chance 
ro get fom times rh<1t amount, more subjects prefer to take- $5 despi te the 
fact Lhat rhe expened Yalue of both options i� exaclly the same. Conversely, 
:23. St·, :"Jonal 1\lt H i i�. Vtv11 r�> 11 l.tll/11111!{ f>rinojllP. in PRI�C:IPLI-Il ':)�' 1 1·.:-.il 1:'\C.: Rt·. \l>l'C :' 
0:'\ Till· OR\ K· Poun IHO. IWl 1.\ndr�·,,· ,·on I l ir,d t S.· Andre"· A.�hworth nb .. 199X). 
�-1. _.,,.,. Pohnsk1 & �II;,, ell . 'upm nolt· :i. at HH!l-Xl (<-xplainitJg 1 ilar ll<'c;nJ�t· ol n'k ;Jn·r:-Hlll 
fint·s .1bu im po:-l' so< 1.tl t •1�1�l. 
25 . .),., S t l  \ F'\ Sii\HI I . l·.D ),()\)1( A'.\1.\'SIS OI .\C:C.IDF'\T I,\\1'19/-9� ( I 9X7). 
�6. Fo1 a MtlllllJan nt .-mpiriral 1 t'�t·<trdJ :-;llgg('sting thai mo:-.1 1wopk injllrt·d b' t•>niou' 
lwlta,·tcll cle� tiiH bt ing .1 1 1 1 1 1  ,lt't ton . �n· l\lirh;rel J . Saks. /Ju IIi Nm/�r J.,·,lllu' -\nythiug ·lhout tht 
IMwl'll•l'aj tlll "/or/ /.ili.J!flllll/1 .\\ \11'111-A llll II 'l1y .\'ut?. l·lO l . P ·\. l..  RF\ . I 1 -l  /. I 1 6�-1).'\ ( Hl�l�). (:f. 
I'.S. A l l\ \ 1 ! .  Till ll\\1\C.I·'> I .< H  I I  R\ 1 · 1 ''1-:10 C Hl!J/1 lcritit i1.111g r lw lt�ltt·n a\prn' 111 ron-ba.,t·d 
< "" 'I )l'lh:l "' '" J .  
�Y tOWr\ L\ 1 \' H.D 'lfvr [ �0041 
laced \,·itlt a ch<�ice between a certain loss and a �:;q cl1ance of losing four 
rirne� that anwunt. more subjects prefer lO takt· their chances, once again 
despite the fau thai the expected value of both options is exactly the same. 
Behavioral decision researchers refer to thi phenomenon as the rdlectio11 
effect or the gain/loss fram ing effect. and rhey explain this efFect i n  terms of 
loss a\ersion.:; People are so av('rse tO actually incu1Ting a loss thar they are 
willing w risk a larger loss in order to avoid a certain smaller lo-s.
�.� In other 
words, when all the options present the possibility oF loss. loss aversion leads 
ro a mste for ri.-k. 
Two main finding· from behavior-al decision research guided our 
experimental design. Fir t,  both uncertainty i n  probabiliry and uncenaimy 
in omcome have similar, preclicrable effeCLs on decision-making (along the 
lines of the reflection effect discussed above. i.e. risk a,·crsion with gains, risk 
-eeking with respect tO losse , and subject to bmt��dary effects)_:.�· Second, 
within a given range of probabilities or outcomes, incli"iduals are ··ambiguiry 
averse" meaning that they dislike uncertain choices more intensely when 
they do not know the odds of the outcome at any given point in the range.:m 
Our experiment tests these findings in the context of uncertainty 
regarding Lhe consequences of a violation of a legal norm. The experiment 
examines Lhe preferences of participants rt"garding rwo aspects of 
uncertainty: uncertainty i n  Lhe probabiliry of detection and uncen.ainty i n  
the size of the sanction. With respect to the size of the sanction. the 
experiment tests participants' preferences under three different conditions: 
certainty (in which the sanction is fixed), risk (in which there are nvo 
equally possible sanctions) and uncertainty ( i n  \,·hich there are two possible 
27. Ser genemll_)' CHOICF.S, VALL;L<;, At\:D FRA;\IES (Oanid K<ll111tlllan & Amos Tversky t:ds., 
�WOO) (colltcLiug leading essays growing out of "l\ersk\ and h.Lthncman's research on prospect 
theory); Daniel Kahncman & Amos Tvcrsky. Pros pert Theo 1y: ;-\n .-1 IWiyJis of Decision Under Ris/1, 4 7 
E<:o:-.:o�u::TRIC.\ 26� ( 1979); Amos Tvcrsky & Oanid �lhn..:m,lll. l?allol!al Chotce (!lid the Fmming 
of Decisions, 59 J. BL=s. 251 ( 1 986); A.rnos Tversky & Daniel 1-:;thnetnan. The Framing of Decisions 
nnd ti'U' Psychology of Choice. 2 1  I SCIENCE 453 ( 1981). There b ,, boundary effect that explains tht: 
appeal of loneries and slm machine�, however. Su�i<'<"b app�·.1 r  10 bt· risk-sec.:king whc::n there is 
a small possibilirr of a \·ery large gt�in. Converse!). �ubje< h .tppear w be risk-avoitling when 
there is a small probability of a very large loss. Tlli, law:r phenomenon may· help to expl.tin 
what mar ·eem to be inordinate publ ic concern about km !I equ�·ncv high damage evems such 
as nuclear accidetiiS. ,)'pp HOWARD MARGOLIS. Df.\LI'i<. \1'1 I I I  RISK: \\'I!Y THE Pl:BUC :\�0 THI:: 
EWERTS OISA<.;REI:: I �m ( 1996). 
28. See Amos Tverskr & Daniel Kahneman. l.oss Au,.,.11"'' in Riskless Choice: A Reftrenre· 
Dependent NfmU>l. IOli Q.J. Econ. 1039, 1040 ( 1 9 9 1 )  (rt·\·ie\\'ing pre\'i<.llt:. lindings regarding los:. 
aversion in risky choices and extending theory LO account f(n· los..; ,,,·crsion in riskless choices). 
29 See Oa\id V. Budescu et al., 1Hudeling Cntaull.) l:'quiun.lrnt.s Jot Imprecise Gambles. 88 
0R<.;ANIZA!'IONAL BEl 1\\', & HL'M. DECISION PROCI::SS�-'> 7-IH. 7·1V-50 (2002). 
30. See E.llsberg, supra note 18, at ()4�-69; M�tcCrimnHHt c • L<trson, supm note 18, at :�69-
76: .lee also Gideon Kerrn & Leonie E.M. Gerritstn. On thr kolm�tw·" nnd Pn.wblr Arrnunts nj 
Ambi,e,wl\' thwloion. 10:-\ .-\CI'.\ PSYC :IIOLOCICA 1 4.9. I m1 ( 199\1! 
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anction but no information abom their relative Jikelihood) . 11 With respect 
to the probability of detection. the experiment te ts participants 
preferences under three corre ponding condition : certain probability ( in  
which the probabili[)' of detection i a fixed percentage) .  ri k) probability 
(in which there are n,·o pos ible probabilitie of detection, the relative 
likelihood ofwhich i known ) .  and uncertain probability ( in which there are 
two po siblc probabilities of detection but no information abom their 
relative likelihood).3� 
For ca ·c of eli cussion. we call these three condition .. ccnain," ··risky," 
and .. uncertain" when referring to both the ize of anction and the 
probabili ty of detenion. A certain sanction is therefore a fine of X dollars. A 
risky sanction is a fine of cirher Y or Z dollars when the probability ofY and 
Z are known, for example, '"'hen they depend on the outcome of tossing a 
fair coin. An uncertain sanction is a fine of either Y or Z when the 
probabilit ies are unknown. Similarly, the probability of detection i certain 
when it is X%. The probability is risky \vhen it is either Y% or Z% and the 
probability that it is either Y% or Z% is known. for example. when the 
probability depends on the results of to sing a fair coin. The probabili[)' of 
detection i uncertain ,,·hen it i either Y% or Z% and the probabili[)' that i t  
i Y% or Z % is unknown. The combinations re  ulting from these conditions 
can be repre emed in wbk form. Each box in Table A repre ent a different 
combination of experimental conditions. For example, box '-1 repre ems the 
c� e in which the anction i risk) and the probability of detection i certain. 
The boxe are numbered so that ,,·e can refer to the combination� lates· in 
the Anicle. 
'-\ I 1 111, clJ,IIIlC 11011 bt'l\\t'l'll !)l<>babih�IIC and II \It' lll1(l'll.lllll} C OIIt''IJCilHI' Ill thai 
ht•twn·n I "" .llld IIIHt'l l:lllll\ llltJ:.I 131111)11'<1� associat�rl \\llh Knlghl . .  \11 ;!I'II WII) rR '"" H. 
1\..'lt.lll. Rl'-" l''t I·Rf\1'>: 1'1 '''' I'RnHr (1921).  Thus. pmbahllbm tlll(<:'ll.lllll\ unolw' a C.ht' 
of .\ J'<'l"lll ''hu condun� a lollt.l'\ ,,·uh known probab1hlit',. loJ ,.x,1mpk. Ill'''"� .t tau nun In 
ronuao,t .. 1! uc·- 11llt t'll,lllll\ 111\uln·, .1 ca.� .. · of ;t pen.on whu rondun-. .t lnttt'l'\ \\tth 1111 knm,,, 
ptob.ththtlt',. 
:�2 II '' '"111h lltlllllg 1h.11 "·•· dtd not tC:.t d condi11on ol complc:H· 1111t t•Jiallll\ in winch 
t•llht't tlw .11111111111 ''' 1lw s.t1HII01 1  01 lilt:' probability ot dt•tt't tion 1:. t omplt•tt•h unknm,·ll­
twc .111'1' 'II' h ,, c ondtlltlll '" """ 1101 ha\t· <JIJOI,·t'd u:. II>  i">l.ttt· llw dkc 1 1 1 1  till< t'ltallll\ ,L, 
c omp:tH·d 1 1 1  ,.,p.-c tc•d \.Jhw. 
H9 /0\IV.:\ /.A W 1<1-.Tlf:"Y\' I �!HH I 
T:\fH.f A 
SIZE OF S.\'.!CTI0:-.1 
LiKEI . IHUOO OF DED:C:TI0:-.1 Rl. KY CNC :ERT.\1. 
CERT ·\1. PROB:\HILITY 7 
RISKY PRO�AB ILITY 8 
U�<:ERT\IN PROB.-\BIL .ITY 9 
There are a few prelimi nary observ;uions to be made with respect to this 
tahle and it!) applicabil ity outside the laboratory. Fit·sr, cenainty or 
unct'rtainty refe r ro the subjective con\'iction of individuals A sancrion is 
certain i f  the potential criminal or torLfeasor believf'� she or he knows it<; 
magnitude. Second, different individuals have di fferent information and 
th erefore the control of the legal system over the cenainty or uncertainty of 
the relevant parameters is lin1ited. Sometimes, the ve1y same scheme or rules 
\vi i i  appear more certain to some actor-; than others. For instance, it is l ikely 
rhar the same rules may be seen as falling within our "cenain" or ·'risky" cells 
by more experienced offenders while tht' · will be seen 'L<; falling within our 
··uncenain" cells by less experienced off<'"tlders. Third, as thi suggests. each 
box in the table represen t-; an idealization that is not fully reali?.able in the 
contt"Xt of a modern legal system. Although a legal system 1T1ay adopt rule 
or practices that i nfluence the degree of certainry r·egarding sanction or the 
probability of detection, the manipulability of certainty is l imited. Finally, 
the rreaunent of uncertainty is likclr to depend in practice on an almost 
infinite and diverse set of factors. including contextual facwt-s that cannot 
ahvays be examined experimentally. For example, people may treat 
uncertaiuty differently depending on whether it involves small or high 
probabi l i ties:n or whether i t  invol\'eS fines or impri onmen r.·�·l Uncertainty 
111ay also depend on their u�jective understandi ngs of the legitirnacy of the 
legal norm in question�" or the existence of extra-legal sanctions Stich as 
shame:. 
As a result of these and other limitations on th i::; kind of research, there 
are difficultie- in classifying nead" .. real world" ituations i nto rhese 
:B. For a n:\·iew of the lilernwre <HI liw prohl..-rn of high impan. low freqnen�:y r·isk.�. s<-c 
gl'nc:-rally NL\RGOLIS. mpm note '27. 
:�-1. For reasons why people ma> ht n:<k �n·kn1" \,·i th re::sp<:rt lO tntprisonm�:m. �t-C' Harel & 
St-gal. �UfJrtt note H. at 295-97. :�!i q: Bntmrlmy l�(ferL� . .mjmt nme 7. :11 �·7 1  {cli�ClL'>Sing their decision tn rnune a p0u·mial 
La:'\ clecluction ;Ls being one that the IRS di:.<di<mt>d ror ret,nns 1 hat 5onw arconntan L'- did not 
.tgiTl' \\ith). 
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somewhat idealized nine combinations and, conversely, i n  creating rt>ali'itic 
simations in rhe laborator-y . .  ;t'venheless, the experimental approach ha. 
great advantages i n  that i t  allows for the isolation of reJe,·am ,·ariahlfs in 
vvays that are not possible outsick of 1 hC:' laboratory. 
C. 'li-lt: E'<.PERJMENr 
PmticijJants and Design: Forry-four undergraduate students from The 
Hebrew U niversity of Jerusalem participated in the experi ment. The 
participants were recruited through a campus advertisement promising a 
monetary reward for participaring i n  a deci ion making task. The design was 
a ··within subject" design, so 1hat <'<'lch of the subjects participated in all th<" 
experimental conditions. 
Procedure: Upon arrival l0 the labora10ry, the subjects lvere seat<"d i n  
front of a personal moniwr and gi,cn instructions concerning the t a  k .  All 
questions concerning the expt>riment were answered and instructions , .. ,�ere 
repeated until the participants indica1ed that they fully undcrswoci the­
instructions. 
The e-xpe1imem was fully computerized. During the insb·uctions, the 
panicipants learned tllat th<"y would be asked lO make decisions in rwenry­
s<"ven rounds of the experiment. and that they would be pairl on 1he basi of 
their decisions in two of the rotmds. which would be selected random tv afL<:·•· 
r h ey completed the decisions in all the rounrls.'11; Pa nici panrs
. 
were 
encouraged to think carefully about each of the decisions. 
In each round. participants were asked to choose between option A and 
option B. In each case, option A. was a d<"cision to do nothing and rhcrefort> 
keep the IS 40 (about $8) ·n 1hat they were paid for participating. ln each 
case. option B was a deci ion to recei\'c an additionaJ NIS 30 (about $<i) 1hat 
would expose them to a 1·isk of ··bei ng caught and required to pay a fine.'' In 
each case 1he potential fine was larger than the additional · ts �0 the 
participant would r<"ceive if she or he chose option B. The potential fines 
ranged from JJS �5 (about $7) ro IS 70 (about $15). The probabilitie of 
rletcction ranged from 5% to 60%. 
The C\\fentv-se\'en rounrl� included Llw nine types of logicallv pos. ible 
combinations prese-nted in table A above. with each of r h ree clitl"erent 
expened values. Thus, for each of the ni nt> combinations there were 1 hn"e 
:�1). Th!" praniu· ol p;t\.11!� suhjcn� on dw basi.s ol a rando111 seh·nion anulllg JIHIIiipk 
n Hind:. i� a com moll pr;tn i< t• 1 n lwha' 1< 1ral dct isio11 1 •·:-,·arch bt·C<t liM' i 1 k<"t·p� •·ach chr 111 t• Ji:-b 
and. 1!111�. J>lt'\.t'lliS p:-snit •pa1H� lrom ! J almng all !lw rounds .ts Ollt: g.tnw Cthcreb' tt•;tli·;ing th<" 
IJ<:ndi1:-. ol 1lw Jm,· of l.trgc ntllllbcJ·s). In addnion. 1hi' pranin· ..tll<.n,·, a grnnr1 numb•·• ol 1dals 
'' ith a hmited amount ql rr:-.< lllrC<:' Bec;JIIw th<" ��tl�jen., nnh ic,u1lt'd a1 l lH· t'JHI ol the 
""Jl<"lllllt·nl "·hnhe1 rl!t•\ ,,.t:,..: ··caugln" and .. tiJH"cl .. in ilw two rouncb that w<·n· -cl•·nt•d. lh<'fl' 
'h<>llld III II  h<l\<' h<'t'll ,jgnifiCl l l l  lt•arlling t'fk< L� IJ\'t•l lht• (Ollll>(' ol ill<" C:--JWriliWI11 
:�7. .\1 ilw rii1lc ol ilw <'XJWrimcJII a "". l�r;wli Slwkd (�1!-.1 "·L' "·onh ,Jiglnh lll<JJ<· 1h;m 
lWI'Ill\ I <'Ill-;. 
H�) IOWA /.A W 1-U:T/r;W r �oo-1- 1 
rnllnds wirh the ;;anH' stntctun· but cl iff{·n�nt <"Xpt:'ctecl val l les. I t t  ord<."r 10 
pn'\'{;'1 1 [  erfects or order. the sequence i n  which the twenty- ·e,·cn choi ct:s 
appeared on tht' screen was arhitrary and changed from one panicipam w 
<tl lother. Table B summarizes the ci.iffe rt>nt choices offered w the 
panicipants. Recall that in each case. the participam faced a choice between 
doing nothing (and keeping the tS 40) or taking a11 additional l ·r 30, 
;;u�ject to the risk of being caught and requi red to pay a fine. Table B 
summarizes the clifferenr chances of being caught and the different fines 
f�Ked i n  each of the twenty-se\'f::·n possibilitif' . 
TABLE B 
SUMl\·IARY OF EX PERiivfi.::�TAI. CO�IBI. ATIONS 
(EXPECTED VALUES: 0=. flS 2'�; E=t IS 1 5; F=NIS 7.5) 
l.!!-:EI.ILIOOU 
c>F DEl F.< rtO:\ 
( }�RT:\1:-... 
PROB,-\BI l.ITY 
RISK\' 
PROIIABII.I IY 
U;-.;n.RTAI:\ 
PRI)I\:\Hil.rt\' 
O.RTAI:"\ 
D: 1 ()91-. :\IS C.O 
E.. :�U%/'\!1$ i)t) 
F '\O%t :"\IS -I:'i 
0: 5'k nr 15% • :"IS Ott 
f.: �0% "' ·itl'ii./ :-...'IS 'itl 
F.-IU% ur tit1%/:\IS 1:. 
D: :\% or l.'i% I NIS Oil 
F.: '10% ur 40%/ !'\IS :;o 
F: 4tl% ur 60%/:-.'IS ·1:'> 
SIZE Of' SA:--ICTIO:-.: 
n 1n<; :-Jl!> ;n ,., ;;o 
U:-.11 :ERT:\1:--1 
D: 111%/1\.IS 70"' ;,n 
E :In% IN I!> fitl or ·W 
F i>rJ<k /�IS -,:. m .I:> 
[) -,•t "' I ,-,.-� :\IS 7tl ur :\11 D· :>% or I ;;%/ :->IS 70 ur �,o 
E.· :!tt';; "' HI'� I :-<1$ liO or Ill F" '10% "r ·111%1 'il$ 1}1) c>l ·Ill 
F: 40% or flll'ii-/NIS ;,;; or :1:; 
() �•''i "' I ;o.; NIS 7tJ ur 511 0: !>% <>t I :;<t/ F'IS 70 or ;,u 
f.. :!0'; "' -Ill<:( I :\IS fill oo ·10 E. '10% 01 411%/ ><IS t)O or ·Ill 
F: 40% c•r tiO%/NIS ;;;, <II '15 
The expected values of all the D combinations are identical in  every 
cel l . l i kewise with the E and F combinations. The expected value are the 
expected value or the additional N I, :�0 that the participanrs received for 
taking the action, m i n us the expected value of the sanction. The expected 
value of each of the D combinations was . IS 24, the expected value of each 
or the E combinations was NlS L 5 .  and 1he expected value of each of the F 
combinations was IS 7.5.:1., Thus. the expected value of option B (taking a 
risk) was always better than option A (dning nothing). 
�H. As a re\'iew of Table B sho,,·s. we \;tri<·d tilt• exp�cted value� by manipularing both Lhe 
sit.<' of the anction and rhe probability of dt"lt'c LiCin. V\'c did this in ord�r to prod11ce a strong 
test of the elh:ct of uncertainty ,,·irhin an t-xpcnmc:ut of manageable duralion. If we had varied 
the expected v:�lue b)' m:�nipulati11g nnl} the ;.in· of the sanction we would be unable to ""Y with 
a11\' nm!idencc whether uncerr.aimy would haq· .t �i111ilar c::!Tect at different prc>bability le1cls. 
Srmilarly, if wt- had varied the expectt>d '<dllt' h1 lll,tnipulating only the probability of' derection 
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The difference> ben\ieen ·'risky'· and ··uncertain" ,,·as as follows. For the 
"risky" factor, the panicipants were told that there was a 50% chance of each 
of the rwo possible conditions. For the "uncertain" fanor, the participants 
were told that t.here were two possible conditions, but that they could not 
know the chances that it would be either of the two. 'l!.l This is an option 
which i nvolves what behavioral economi ts label "ambiguity.''40 The 
complete instructions ( translated from Hebrew) appear in the Appendix. 
After each paruCJpanr completed the twenty-seven rounds, the 
computer selected two rounds at random. For those rounds in which option 
B was selected, the participants carried out the lotteries, using a coin ro 
determine the outcome of 50/50 lotteries and a ten-sided die w decem1ine 
the result of lotteries involving other probabilities. By being asked to wss a 
coin or a die, participants were given a sense that they were not being 
manipulated or misled. In addition, the use of the coin and the die (shown 
to the participants at the omset of the experiment) gave the participants a 
concrete sense of the probabilities involved. The participants v•ere then paid 
according to the results and debriefed concerning the goals of the 
experiment (and pmmised that their identities and the choices they made 
would remain confidential) .  
Our null  hypothesis was that the legal ethos (according to which 
uncertainty in anction is avoided and uncertainty with regard to the 
probability of detection is LOierated)'1 1  promotes enicient deterrence. This 
hypothesis would predict that participants would be neutral or averse> to 
uncenaimy in detection while preferring uncertainly in sanction. We also 
predicted that panicipams would be averse to 1 he transilion from risk lO 
Wt' wuuld bt> unable:- l<J �ay with a1w rrHllidc-nn' wht·thtr tmcenainiY "'ould hav�· a :;imilar effect 
at different sanction le,·t'll>. Scparatt'l�· manipulating 1he sizc:- tJI t l w  sannion and rhc probabilil\ 
of dc::teCiion wo11ld have rt-f]llired doubling thl· duration ot the rxpl:riment, doubling 1he cost 
and itKrl·asing tht' pou:ntial fau�tte of the parucipants. A� a n·�uh, although ,,.<' can �av th<n 
sanction si.!:c, pmbabili1v of dt>tt'CIIon. and tmc ... nainr� all affen panicipanL<. densiom. "'t' 
rannot (()lllpilrt' the �>i7C' of the t'fkrL ... or tht'St' three;' \'llliiiblt'S. All expt'l illll"ntal J't'SCarrh 
involw·� trad<."-olb ot 1 his �on. 
��. Pk�e now 1ha1 for l!w t ombinati•Jns inn>lviug an llllrt•nain �ant tion iLl' nr 
probabi!it) of dt:tection ''e < alt nlatt·cl the expt-rll•d value b�· loll•>"'lll).{ tlw Bernoullt;.�n principle' 
of equalh weighting Jil l he pos�ihilitit's. In �implt:. intuitiw tetm:- thai means trt·<Hillg a rangl· a ... 
if it "'t'l(' thl.' t111dpoint o! iht' rall�l' Thus. for instance, Opiion n on tlw IO\\'t•J left Ct'll 111\'<Jh'\'CI 
a kHH't\ which gan· panidpant� t·it ht·r 5� or I :J<,W. p1 obabilil\ or lo�in){ 'IS GO. \'t·L partiripa111� 
did nol kti<l\\' wlwtlwr tht· pt ob;tbibt\ "'OLtlcl hl: ."l'� <>I 15%. l ludt·J tlw tknHHtlli,tn pnnripk. 
tilt' pwbabilit�· th .. , l.t< ··d h c.tlcul<itt•d as J (ll� .  L•ndcr this appr<>.J( 11 tlw t'Xpt•( t('(\ \ <thlt'� or ilH· 
.. rbk� ·· and ··unct'n atn- < •>ml)i H.:tuons a1 e idt'lll ira!. For a d>�ntssion or 1 ht· Bt'rnoulli<tn 
P1 itlltplC'. �l't' Dan!t'l �\n he mat t & :\mos T1 n,;k1·, C/witt'.'· I 'n(lll''· nnd Fmll/t'l. Ill C:i!OICF.�. 
V\UT:-.. \'\D FR:\�11-.-.. \U{JIII llOI<:' '27. cll 2-3. 
-Hl. St•t• \llfJm noll· I X  anrl .Kt<llliJMllVJng ll'�l. 
·1 1 r ... . I dc•J.Iilt•rl c l  iM ll .. �illll 'll I hi-.. It-gal "' hll�. "'(' illjl'll P;H I' I I  I .A. f -�. I l l .  g I -�. 
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t t l lcenaint\.  This conjenur<' ,,·as ba:--ed on tht- rich litcratttrt' establ ish i ng 
that inclividu .. tls are ambigui ty-averse. '
:! 
Framing By design , the n.:pet·i rn<:-tll  did not include a ve-ry detai led or 
·'thick" framing. Participants were not asked LO imagiue tlwmsel\'es 
comm i tt ing a particular crime or a civil  wrong. Instead . the- insrrucrions 
simply g<m:· the participants an unclerstattding that choosing the risky 
alternative i m·olved conHltt tt i ng a wrong !'or whiclt they could bt· ·'caught" 
and mack to pay a "fine." Thus, the i nSU"ltr tion:. stated that ·'if �'Oll choose 
option B you wil l get an additional :�o NJS. 8ut vou f�1ce a risk of being 
caught and required to pay a fit te." [f  anything. tht· Hebrew words used fo r 
"caught" and '·fine" suggest punishment for a wrong e\·en rnure strongly 
than t.he English translation . These t.enw; were repeated in the instructions 
precedi ng each round. The intent was lo fra111e. i n  as open-ended a form a::> 
possible . choice B as a wrongful choice. 
We chose such thin fram i ng because there i :.o little prior research on 
the effect or u 1 tccrtainty on deterrence. We wished to isolate , as much as 
possible, the effect of uncertainty. recogn izing ti lar thicker framing could 
produce different results. For example . if choice B were framed so that i t  
involved a Vt:l)' serious wrong thm would strongly violate the moral 
sensibilities of research partic ipant<; and expose anyone who was caught tO 
substantial shame, it seems quite po ·sible that participams would have been 
more reluctam to choose option B even in a laboratol)' context. The effect 
of thicker fram ing 1·equires funher research .  
Of cour'e. this choice o f  framing is one reason for caution i n  drawing 
strong conclusions from our research. , evenheless, i t  is precisely this need 
for caution that emphasizes the signi f icance of this kind of research for the 
enric hment of law and economic analysis. lf it is imponam to exercise 
caution when dra•ving conclusions from an analysis that is sensit ive to the 
effecr.s of u ncenainry but consciously ignon:s the consequences of thick 
frami ng; the11 it is even more i mponan r to exercise caution when drawi ng 
conclusions frorn an analysis that ignores both framing and uncertainty. 
[n our experi ment, the decision '"as analogous t.o the gain/loss gambles 
studied by behavioral decision researchers. 1:1 Participants considered 
whether to take the chan ce i nvolved io choosi ng to accepr an addi t ional 30 
sheke ls. If they took the chance, they would either receive a gai n  (Lhe 30 
shekels) or be subjec[ to a loss (a fine r haL would be greater than 30 
shekels). 
This gain/loss research design sharply distinguishes our expel'irnent 
from prior hehavioral decision research on compl iance with norms. 
-12. SPP wpm note: I H .tncl <�.<.companving- text: Htjmt I Hilt: 29. 
43. Su 1\'lanlw\\' Rabin 8.: Richard H. Th;ller. r\numaltP:.: Risk :\tJPI:5ion. J. E<:o�. PF.RSI' .. 
Winter 2001 . •  tt ��H (dbc.tt::.sing- the implin1tions ot �mall smkt·s ){ain/loss gamblt:s for th(' role 
of ckcn:asing rn:trgn�<d utilitr of wt:alth to risk <nersion ) . 
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ExperimenL'> in prior research have been carefully designed so that decisions 
are obviou ly and unambiguously rramed as in\'oh·ing- either a loss or a 
gain."H This prior research has confirmed the gain/los. framing effect i n  the 
context of compliance with legal norms; namely, people are risk-preferring 
when choosing among options that involve only lo ses and risk-avoiding 
when choosing among options that involve only gains.�c, \1\'hile important, 
these findings are di fficult w apply lO choices that pn."sem the possibility of 
gains and losses-which we believe to bt> the case in vc1y many situation 
involving the ch oice to violate a legal norm. Indeed, the earlier research left 
open the following verv important question: When people face a decision 
that presentS the possibil ity of either a gain or a los , do they evaluate the 
"gain'' and "loss·· outcomes separate!)'· so that the' are risk <1voiding with 
respect w gain possibilities and risk preferring with respect to loss 
possibil ities, or do they evaluate the gains and lo ses together, so that their 
risk aujcude depends on whether they perceive the sum of gains and losses 
as positive or negative? 
D. RJ:.Sl il.TS 
Table C summanzes the results. As described above, parllCipants were 
a ked to choose lwtween option A (in which they stop with IS 40) and 
option B ( in which they ger an additional IS 30 but are su�jected to the 
risk of incurring a fine). The l lumbers in table C denote the number of 
times option B was chosen (i.e., the choice to take a risk). EYery participant 
faced each combination with thrct> different expected values. Given that 
the n .. were forty-four pan icipams, the maximum number of B choices is 132 
in each box. 
+·!. For an •·xampk of thb I' JW of cxptTintt-1 1 1.  set: Ho111111t11) l:ffi'l'll, .llt/JJ'II note 7, ;.tl �H(i 
lnunparing taxp;l\·t-r <'OlllJ>liann· in ,.ittJ<IIion" in which tl 1e dt-ri�l<>ll 1u wkc an impn>JH'I 
ckduniun product·� .1 l:11 g<·r rdnnd-and. thll�. ill\oives a g<llil-a" opp<"cd w �iLUation,. i n  
"hich tht- d�·cisi•111 1 1 1  take a n  impr opt•r dcduni•>n prvdrH t: S  a smalkr :1ddinonal tax pa�·nw•H­
.tnd. thus. 111\'f)IW:-. a ,m,dlt·l J .J,s). 
·G. Jd. \'\'hcn tin JChng wlretll<"l ltJ  take ,1 P""-'ibh ille!{al t,\x clc-rhtCllf rll in ,\11 l':!>.j>t:rinH·nt.d 
siruaru•JJ. paniciparn, "·lur had h,rcl in!.utliciertl t.tx•·� wnhheld (and 1hu;. would ha\t' I<> makt- :1 
l.lr)!.<'t !.tX p;tl'lllt-111 tl lltf'l dtd not rake r lw cl.·clut 1mn) \\'t:fl' ntorc· J ik,·h '" t<lke the dedurllcJII 
Jlr;tn parnnp.tnl,. 1-!11 • h;ul t'l!Dll).\11 1.1-:e� willtlwld llt:n llwv \\'onld rerc·J\e .1 laX refund c·r!lwr 
1\·;n .  l'lw re,<'ardH·r' «m.-lurkd Jltat dw p.u ucipants 1d1<1 1\tHrlcl 11,1\C' '" lll:tkl· ,, tax p.lllttel l l .  
f1�tmc·d dw deu:-.1on ;1� 1 1 n·oking 01 llk 1•>:-."·�. and rnade tht' ckcistoJ! 111 the· risk-prt·ft-rnng 
JWtllllt'l 1ha1 pr o�p<·< 1 ilW•H\ IHH r l c l  ,.,tgge-�1 1 1 1  the· r,·;dllt of lo�e'. Tlw p<tninpants ,,·hn wotdd 
I <'< cJ\<· a rdn11d t<!llwr \\;1\ lr.mwd tltc.> dn J!>ion ;�,. i l l\Clhing onh ga11h and thert ntade ilw 
de< i:-11111 in 1lw n;.k ,1\c·J:-c nt.tllJH"r thai pr":.JWrl tlwon \\'otlld -<ugg<'-'1 i1 1  1hc realm ol gai11:. /tl 
.11 !.ih-iX. 
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T:\BLI:. C 
COMI31 ED FREQUENCY OF B CHOICES 
(OUT Of POSSIBLE l:�2) 
Slt.r: oF SA.\iCTIO!'\ 
LIK£1. 1Hoou or DEn:cnoN C FR T .-\10: RISJ-;\ UNC:ER r:\lN 
CERT:\1:'\ PROB.\BII.l fY 75 (56°'c· ) 5� ( 40%) <19 (37%) 
Rt Sl\Y P 1{0 F\,-\ f\ I ! . lTV 60 ( 45%) +-1 (:�;{%) :�8 (29%) 
UNCERT.-1.1!\: PROBABil.llY 52 (�9%) 44 r��{%> � I  (23%) 
SUM 187 1 4 1  l l fl 
1 �004 1 
S t - � t  
1 77 
1 42 
127 
Table C shows clearlv that the number a n d  percentage of B choices 
increases with the certainty of the fine and the certainty of the probability of 
being caught. Thus, the experimem rtjectecl the null hypothesis in pan. 
Participants were averse to uncertainty in both anction and the probability 
of detection. Indeed, comparing the certain/cenain cell of Table C with the 
Jisk)1/risky and uncertain/uncertain cells. the results are quite striking, 
particularly in light of the fac t  that choice B always had a higher expected 
value than choice A. 
Tables 0, E. and F show the same data separately for each expected 
value (Table · D, E. and F correspond to the 0. E, and F combinations in 
Table B). Again, the general pauern remain:,, though the reversal of the 
expected result in the shift from risky to lii iCertain probability in Table D 
suggests (as the statistical analysis confirmed) that the difference between 
the risky and uncertain combinations was less robust than the difference 
between the certain and risky comhina(ions. 1'' 
46. Although we cannot offer a ddiniti�·e explan.won for the reversal of the expected 
result in Tabk D. two possibilities are as folio,,·�- Fir�t. it i� possible that participants weiglm·d 
the possihilities in the ''uncertain" table usin� the- 13erncntllian method of treating equallr 
u nknown possibilities equally. This seem� unlik<:l) itt light of the robust results in other 
experiments regarding ambiguity aversion aiiCI the fact th.tt the expected result is ob!:ierved in 
Table� E and F. Second. it is more likely that "'�' are nb�enin� a preference reversal in some of 
the participantS at a "boundal)'" in th<: sense di�<u�cd snt"·a Pan I I.B . St'e sufml text 
accompanying note '27. Recall that the D choice� involved the highest expected value, which 
w·as the product of the smallest chance of cit-ten ion ( I  U% in the "cenain" cells and 5% or 15% 
in the "risky .. and "uncertain" cells). and thc- l<u·gest possible line (NJS 60 in the "certain" cells 
and !\IS 50 or 70 in the "risky" and "uncertain" cells) . .  -\s Rabin and Thaler have discussed, 
subjects differ in their aversion lO risk across potential losst:� of different sizes and probabilities. 
Ser Rabin & Thaler, supm note 43, at 22K It set'lll-' plausible that there might be di fferen1 
"boundarie5" fi11· 1·isky and uncenain ch()lce� involving 1ui:-:ecl gain/loss olllcomes. This would 
be a wonlty subject for funhcr rest'arclt. 
THE VJRT!Jb'S OF UNCERTAI Tl" JN LAW 
TABLE 0 
FR£QUENCYOF B CHOICES (OUT OF44) 
WITH EXPECTED VALUE IS 244; 
SIZE OF SANCTION 
LIKELI HOOD OF DETECfiO;--J CERTAI� RISKY UNCERTAI:--1 
CERTAIN PROBABIL11Y 37 26 29 
RISKY PROBABILITY 30 26 22 
UNC!::RTAJ 1 PROBABILI1Y 32 27 23 
SU�1 99 79 72 
TABLE £ 
FREQUENCY OF B CHOI CES (OuT OF 44) 
WITH EXPECTED VAJ.uE IS 15 
SIZE O F  SANCTION 
L l KEUHOOD OF DETECTION CERTAI N R.r$J(Y UNCF.RTAI!"\ 
CERTAIN PROB.J\Bil .ITY 24 1 7  1 7  
R.!Sh'Y PROBABII.ITY 24 1 4  9 
U>ICERTAJJ'\ PROBABTI.ITY 1 5  13 4 
SL 'l\1 ;)! )  44 30 
TABLE f 
FREQUENC Y OF B Cli()JCES (OUT OF 44) 
WITH EXPECTED VALliE . I} 7.5 
SIZE OF SANCT IO!"\ 
Ll KEJ.IIiOOD OF DETF.CTIO:-.i CERTAIN RISJ..'Y LINCER TAI� 
CERTAI. PROBABIIJ fY ]4  J O  3 
R ISJ.-1' PR08ABII .I'fY 6 4 7 
UNCERTAIN PR013ABIJ.JTI' 5 4 4 
SL'M 25 18 1 4  
-163 
SLIM 
92 
78 
82 
St.: M 
58 
47 
32 
Sc ;-.1 
27 
J 7  
1 3  
Examining rhe data demons1rates t h a t  both the level o f  uncertainty ancl 
rhe expected value of the deci ion appear to have made a difference in the 
decisions. The more imponanr result for our purpo e . of course. was lh<" 
effec t of uncen.ainry. The more nncenaimy associaLed with opt ion B. the ]e.,s 
like!� panicipams "'ere w rh oose it. 1 n addirion, rhe higher the t"Xperwd 
,·alue of option B, t h e  more like!) participanLs were to choose.: i t .  Although 
this Iauer relationship i� ob,·inus and unsurpcising. it is nen·rrlwles� 
47 A' di�nrsM·d regardill!-{ T;rbl<" B. 1\t> calculalt>d the t"XIW< ll""fl value ot lht· ··uiiCt"l nun-
<l l l l ll)ln,tlron� :1� li re nw.m •Jt 1lw 1wo po,,ibililit·'· SN• It"Xl att omp:nning \llf!m no1c :{�J. 
I 'LOO·I J 
imponan t  w the an<lh-;is of our resulrs bec:wse i t  strungh ..;uggests th;n 
pani('ipanr!'. LOok tht·i t· decision seri<.HI"I�· and ant· m ptt>d tn make: rati<Hl<ll 
clec isio1 1s. 
V\'e submiued tht' dam to a two-way repeated ANOVA, '·' with one �anor 
clisLingui ·hi ng among the three le\·els of cenainty for the:- sanction. and 
another r�1ctor distingui"l1ing among the three le\.els of cenai nry for tlw 
probability 11f being caught. '\' We tind a significant dll"ct ol sanction 
ccnai ntv ( F� -.. =K.£1:1. pdl.CIO l ) .  and a -;ignificam effect of' probabil i t  � cenai nt\. 
( F� , ... = l �).�2. pdJ.O! J l ) . -.1, 
There i a '\trong. signifi<:ant difference between the ('Crtain ·annion 
and the rwo uncertain ..,,111nions (risk and uncenainrv) pooled together 
(F,  , , ==  1 O.G2, pdl.() I )  and 01dy a marginall)' signifi('ant differe1 1Ce between 
risks sannions and unn.:nain sanctions <F�. � .=2.9, p=O. I 0) .  The resu l t  i · 
sim ilar to1 the cenaint\' of the probability: namely, there i-; a strong, 
signiti cam difference between certain probabilities and the t\vO u ncertai n  
probabi l ities pooled rogC'rher (F1 ,,=22. 19, p<O.Ol )  and only a marginal ly 
significant difference ber ,,·een risky and u ncertai n probabilitic (F,  ,.,=�3.:H, 
p=0.07). Ove>rall. these findi1 1gs suggest that behavior is i 1 dluencecl by 
certainty (both certainLy with re pect w the sa11crion and certainty with 
respect lO the probabi l i ty of detection),  while Lhe difference between risk 
and uncenai 1 1 tv under the conditions we tested is smalkr and on ly 
marginally significant. 
F. I.V/'1�/U'REI>'. TrOt\' OF RF ... 'iUI. 'JX 
.-\ccorcl ing to our results, uncertainty with regard to eirher the size of a 
st.ulc t iun or the probabi li t) of detection increase cieterr('nce. To differi11g 
degn:::cs. these resul ts pose a challenge to imerpretation in ligln of both 
prospect thco1�' and expected util ity theory.''' In the end, tht> results can be 
4:-1. Al\:0\':\ (anahsi:; of' "arian('C') is a �uuistical tcchniqne dt'sigm·cl w < heck \\'ht::thcr 
diflerell<'(·s in illt'.llb het\\'t'<'ll t'Xpt·rimcntal conditions are signilicanl ( i t' .. ,,·hcther it is 
reasonable 1o as ume that there are n::al diff'crettccs in the JXlpuhuinu). or \\'ht·f hl·r one is abk 
w t·c:jen ,,·ith ronlidt·nct· tlw hypotlwsis that the mean.� are equal (i.e .. thai lltt' dif'lcreuccs wc 
st·c .1rt> ju�t "11oise" iu th�: sa111ple). 
4�. .-\NOV.-\ tt'quires a Clllltinuous dependem variable. As out nle,t;o,uremcnts are 
ratcguriutl (biiiM)'), we Slltllltll'cl tht' values of the lhrec:: differem ques1ion-; (expened values) 
in each cell. and perl(mm·d .\NO\'A on the resulting measun·ment:.. ,\llc:n,ttilt.:lr, a LOGIT 
regression anahsi� l(,r repl':ltl·d measures om be adopted. ·nti:. analvsi., i,- mott: complicated, 
1111d therefon· 11111 reponed in c.letail. evenheles  we performed it, and thc results are 
es.-.. :mially 'unil:tr: 'ignilicant efi(:CL� of sanction ( '04,= 12.2, p<O.O I ) .  pn,hahiliry ( ·: .,,=�9.6. 
p<O.O I )  and expt>nccl 1·alur ( ',,,=I O:Hi. p<O.O I ) ,  with 110 significant pair-\\·lst' tnh:t<tCtions. 
:iO. Ttwrt· is 110 sigto iti!'allt interaction he tween tht:: cffeclS ( F,., .-O.X I) .  The lc,·el ol 
Ct't taint)' in the sauc tion dolt'S not influence the magnitude of influrtH l' ol tht· cenaitHy of 
pr<>babi lit)', and 'l<'t: vt:r·sa. 
5 1 .  Pr(>:ojX'CI tht>oo-y b tht> name giv�::n lO the branch <>f behal'ior.tl decision research 
as�ociat�c·d 1\'illt Kahlll'lllan .tud '1\l'r�ky. See .!,fi'TIPml�)' C:HOIU$. \':\1.1 :Es. \ 11 FR.-\;\IE.'), ·'ufJm IIOte �7. Expt'ctt'd lllilitl I I IC'OIV is the name gi,·cn w the lraditiun,tl, non-lwlt.tli(or,tl .tpproach lO 
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entirely rcconcileci with prospect theory. but onl) panialh ret onciled with 
expected utili() theot;. 
We discu s separate!) the tran ition 
ri ky to uncertain anction . certain to 
uncenain probabilitie . 
from cenain to 1 i-.k\ .,anction . 
ri ky probabilitit''>. and risk�· to 
The Tmnsilion from Certain to R i.skJ Sanctions ( 1 to 4. 2 to '>. ami 3 10 6 in 
Table ). This transition increase uncertaimy with regard to lo��es. Thu , 
consistcfll with the reflection effect observed in prospect t hcol\ rt·:-.carch, we 
might expect participants to be risk-preferring. Jndct·d. this  \,·as the 
prediction made by one of us in an earlier article.':.> Yt·t. our results 
dc monst r<Hc risk aversion-the result that would be prcciictt•d b;. cxpecrcd 
mili ty theory,"':� which prospect theory research has dcmonstl a ted to be 
ddiricnt in important respects.
;;., 
The apparent contradicrion can be resolved through t i lt· recognition 
that the B opt ions in our experiment involved gains a wc..:l l as lo<;scs, and 
that the potential for gain consistently outweighed the pot e n t ial fot· los . . 
Pt ior cxpcrimelllal re-earch on compl iance with legal not nt" was carefully 
ron truned so that there were no mixed gain/lo option-,. ' In that co ntext , 
the researcher found. con i tent with the g-<.tin/lo:-.:-- It .11ning dTt'ct 
explai ned b� pro pect theory. that participant!) were ri:-.1-..-p• t�krring \,·hen 
options in\'Ohed on I) los. es and ri 1-.-a\'oiding when option-. i m olq:d onl� 
gain·. B\ contrast, our expe1iment pre emed th<:' mo1 e t om pi<·:-. (and 
rt"al istic) ·ituation in which both gains and losse · a t e  po..,-.i))k < H llcomes of 
the "iolat ion of a legal nom1. 
Thi. design raist>d thl" que Lion whethe• participant" wnttld frame tht· 
lo and gain po sibilities separately-beha\'ing in a ri.:;k-ptl'kt ring manner 
with regard to uncenainty over lo se and a ri�k-m·oiding mannl'l \\'ith 
regard to uncertainty O\'er gains-or whether the p<lnicip;lllt. \\ Ot tld frame 
the losse · and gains together."" The ::;trong pattern of risk an:r..;ion sugg(·sts 
that the partici pants framed the sanction, not as a lo�::.. but rather as a 
t"\, lllOilHC and o1h.:r rauon.d dtotre approat he.·'>. Fot .111 appltc ..tltoll ol <"'P''t tnl util111 1 heon. 
't'e P()ltn�\..v & Slt;l\·ell. llljnn lltll<' !l. 
'l2 .\u Hart'! & . eg<tl. \1/fll"ll nott' .'. ,tt 291-:"09 (min){ P""J><'l 1 tlto••tn to .ugnt· thai 
(l lJillll<tl� \\l)lt(d prd<·J' lllHI"I I,\Ill j)Uill�hlllt:ll\.:>). 
-,:� .')u• Polin!>\..\ & 'ltil\l'll. Sllj>lil noll' :, . •  ll X� I (dhc ll"lllg tht' fl•l.tlfl>lhhtp ht:l\\t'l'll lllilill" 
1 hn1r' .lllcl "'" .1wrsion) 
-,4 \u' \1.111 h·-" Rabm. f)lll/1111\lllllg ,\ lmgnwl { IIIII\ "/ II 11tlth ( "tllllwl I 'I''""' N"k :\ ;•, ntoll. 111 
( .IICliC ' "· \ \I l l "· ''n FR.>.\Ih. 111jntt not<' :li. al �02. 21l:'t-07 !.H�lllll� 1h.11 , • .._pt·c wd 111iltl\ 
tlwon produ<<'' ullsle.tdlll!! • o1H lu�ion� ,,·Jwn "'"Jll.titllll)! -,uh,t.lllll.tl n,\.. .1\t"I'HHI- 1 1 1  th.­
t nnte" ol ptt'Oilllll\! -,illll.ll t t'k IH-lliLtlil\ -,_ \Jll<l' TH"I'"' ,\: n.uud \,,ollllo•llJ.Ill. \dt•t/1/lr\ Ill 
PICJljJI·rt tlnon ( "umulliltl·t Htflli"lltn/ltlll uj l "lln11atlll\. 111 ( I I I li! I ..,, \ \l l ' "  \'II FK.\�11 '· \II/JIII 
lltllt' 'li ,tl -I I (llelllllj.{ th.tt prn�p•·(l lht·ot"\ h..t' t''pl.ltlll'cl tJw tll.IJOI \tlll.lti•Hl' of <"'JII'C It'd 
IIIII II\ tht"llf\) 
:15 \11• \llj)lfl lt'XI .In omp.tll\ I l l� IH)ft• -J-1 
fih. \\o• ,Ill' gt,llt'lll( Ill \11 l .tlJ.H h l01 dhC \h.,l<lll' tlJ.tl ,h.l i JHIWd tHII .tp(ll•'< l.lll<l!l llf tl11� 
J>11111l 
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ronlputlct l t  oLt bettdit . It apJJ<:ars th.u tht· participa n t s  did not evaluart· the 
-;a nnion i n  isc>l<Hioll . but rather in conjunction with the benetit cleriv(""cl 
from 111aking the ri�k\· choice. fu other words. i n  deciding whether Lo choose 
OJ)tion �- the panicipants discounted rhe ,·al uc of the additional 30 !:>hekt>ls 
acrot cling lt> rhe chanc(' of being caught and fined. Th<:' n10re certain they 
could he aboll( the chance of being caught and fined. the more cerr<.lin the' 
could be about the gain from option 13. I n  this way. the participants appear 
to han· fnunecl option B as pre emi ng the possi bi l il"v of· a gaiu. with £1w 
resu l t i ng ri-;k averse hehavior that prospen theory predins with regard w 
crai ns.
- - or course. more re earch is necessarv hefore drawing s u-ong-0 � - " -"  
conclu-;iorls regarding the fra ming of such gain/ loss decisions. 
ThP Tmnsitio-n from Risky fo Unurtaiu Sanclwns (4 to 7, 5 to t ,  a n d  6 to 9 
in Table .-\ ) .  I n  co111rast, this transition can be easily explained. The resull"S 
here rdkct ambiguity aversion-a well-documented preference for known 
ovc· t t i l l  known probabili ties.
",; 
"/'he Transition from Certain lo Risky Probabilitif.s ( 1 to 2, 4 to 5, and 7 to 8 
in Table A ) .  The detenem effect of the tran ition from certain LO risk}' 
probabili ti<>s of detection is the experimenral result that is most inconsistent 
wi£11 the expected utility analysis."\! Prior work i n  economics has taken risk 
a\'e rsion into account; risk aversion ma: explain the preference for certain 
sancriom m·er 1·isk)' sanctions (because there i a broader range of anction 
":•I. l l 11< .1:-pect of our results has to be considerc-d ; 1  �omewht�t \\"t:<tk finding bec.lll�t· it b 
po<sthl<' th.lt rht· participants collapsed the in itial g-rant ol •10 sht:kcls imo rhe chance to gc-t an 
additull!id :�0 and. thus, treated all Lhc possible;: outcome� a:, gain�. notwith!-tanding t1ur dl"on:. 
1o IJanat· tht· B option as a )!;ain/loss gamble. In <>tlkr "'(>rds, the}" 111ay h<t\'(" t'Valu<llecl the 
chotn· ht:t\HTI\ .-\ and B, nCJt a.� \,·e framed it (i.e .. bet\,eC:"Il (:\) .. keeping'" -1-0 slu::keb ;and (H) 
"g-t·ning·· .tn .additional 30 shekels). but rather as a t  hoin: he;:t\,·etn (A) ··!{etting" -10 shC:"kc:-ls and 
(I)) --g�·tting .. a less certain amonnt thal would be no more than 70 :.l tekels and no le�� than X 
�ht·kt·l' ( "·itl• X being a different amount in each rn11ncl of rhc <.:xpcrimt·tlt) . I n  otl lc.:r ,,·orcb. it 
i-. po��ihk that the}· n:framed a two step pr(Jcess consisting of an initial grant of ntotwy and a 
���b�t:C(llt"lll g.dn/I(JSS decision into a one step. pure �.1in cleci�ion . We are inclined 111 cliscoun 1 
thts (l<"'tbilm because bella,·ioral decision research s1rong-ly suppons the hn)othesis rhat 
panidp.11tl'- ,l(ct:pl t he frame that they an.: offert-d. Srr Daniel Kahneman. f'r1'{arl'. in CHOICES. 
\'.\t.t h. \='l> FR·\�1!-:S, suj>m note 27. at "' ("[D ]ecision makers are general!) quite pas�in• ancl 
tht·tdoa e  inclined tO accept any fr<�mt: to wh ich they an:: cxpost:d."). As shown in the 
in�trlllttoaa� 111  this Article's Appendix. the participants wen· told: 
\1 tht• beginning or each round you will he giH·n 40 NIS. Tht:n you \,·ill be asked to 
, hon'l' ht"t\,·een two alternatives: Al temative A or alternati,·e B. The decision will he 
u•tHimted b�- cl icking a button with the nwu:>t". If yma choo:,e A \Oil "·ill keep tht" 
40 '\II'> and the round will end. I f  you choost- R vou will bt' gi,en an extra Y �IS. 
l>ut you wil l  nm the ri�k of being caught and required tO pay a fine. In this case 
\Cill I,·J!I h<a,·e lO return n10ney to the cxperimcntt::r. 
\1•1' rtt/111 \p1>ntdix. This rrarning is ue remains to be explored in sub�equent research. 
:lX '>l't' (/tpm text accompanying note 18. Su gt'nrr tlZv Buclescu. �upra note 29 . 
. "'l'l \·\\· Me: grmefu l for di�cu�ions \,·•th Oren Bargil l, Robert Bones aud Stephen .\l;1rk.� . 
• tt tel n >t tt'�(l• nadenet:: with Peter Siegelman that impruvL'cl ntu ga asp or this potnt. 
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i n  the risky case), but i t  cannot explain the preference for greater rcr ta i nt\ 
with regard to the probability of detection!;n 
Increasing uncertainty about the probability of detection doe-s nor 
increase the range of sanctions or, ex ante, the chance of detection. Before 
rolling rhe ten-sided die that determines the probability of detection, an 
individual c hoosing B in our "risky'. cell face exactly the same probabilitv 
of detection as an individual choosing B i n  our "certain" cells. Thus th1-· 
shifts in the results that occur i n  moving from the "certain" detection 10 tlw 
"risky" detection cells are results that cannot be explained '"ri rhi n t lw 
traditional expected utility fram<:'\\lork. 
Another way of emphasizing the potential significance of our det cninn 
finding is that prior theoretical analysis i m proved on the expectec! util it\ 
approach by recognizing that, because of risk aversion, individuals· bt>ha,·ior 
is no! dictated solely by the expected value of the anction."1 U ncenaint,· 
with respect to the size of the sanction makes a difference because or risk 
aversion.  Our analysis makes a f11rther i m provement by recogn izing that 
individuals· behavior n'la)' also differ ")' tematically from expccred ,·alu<" 
when there is uncenainry over the probability of detection. 
The Transition from Risky to Unrertoin Probabilities (2 to 3, 5 to 6. and 8 to 9 
i n  Table A). The increased dererrt"nt effect of moving from "risk� ·· to 
"uncertain" is more consistem ,,-ith expected ut i lity analysis becwsc one­
cannot with confidence state that the ·'expected value'' in the .. risk'·· anc! 
.. uncertain" cells i equivalent. The expected value is dependent upo11 the 
"'ay that the louery is conducted i n  t h e  "uncertain" cells, and we did not tell 
our participants anyth ing about how that lottery would be ronduct<"cl. 
Moreover. a noted in COI1nection with the t ransition from 1iskv to tmct>nain 
sanctions, prior research on ambiguity '"ould predict that individuals wottld 
be more reh.1ctan1 to tOlerate unknown probabi lities of rhis type than known 
fl� one . 
The importance of attitudes toward risk sugge ts a further rc. ..ason for 
caution i n  generalizing from our results. There are findings that s11ggest th<tt 
the degree of risk-tolerance with respect to small risks, uch a:. small 
mon etary losses. differs from the attitudes to large risks.m As a result .  one 
liO. .'in Polinsk� & Sln\,·cll. �11/Jm 1W1l' :). \'\·c w1itc -mav t>xplain,'· brc:ua<>e . 1  rani{<' p• o,·idt"' 
mort> del\"11<'11<"<' th.111 it.; midpoilll l)lth af lht'rt" i� a <.kclining margin.-tl utilit� <ll llllllW\ anrl. a� 
i\tal!ht
·
,,· Rabin ha" • onrlu�i,·cly clt:mun:-trt�rccl. 1lw declining m;1rgiu;tl Ulilit: of llltlll<"' ··annol 
l·xplain n�k ,�,·<-rsion in rkci;,ions m,·oh,ng :;ul h small anH)Ilnts of morH·�. s,.,, R.d1111. '11/'m nolt' 
:1-1. .tt �()� ( t .. �: planu ng th:\1 the .... i,k ;1\crsiun .. t)b,wnecl 111 bdlotllnral d,,,.l,..lnll . , .,..,.,lit h 1" 
,mrilnnahlt" 1o "los-. <ll·<·r,..HIII. .. not to ala· dr·di11111g IH:.rginal utdil\ of 111on<''·). 
Ill .),•, gp111'1flll\' Pnlirbk\ &: Sh<11·t'll. 'IIJnn lllllt' ;l. �l·t• fll10 111jlm ll<HI' 1 6  .uHI .111 tllllj).lll\JIIg 
It')'; I (prmrrling .Hiciiliunal <llllhOI;l'· supporting 1hb. j)lllj)t>Si l i tm).  
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1\"j)t:'�). 
fi:-\ .\rt Rabm 8.: I haler. llt/Jift null· ·U . .  11 ��K. l11dc:-ctl. "" ,.,pln••·d in 1'.1 1 1  II.! .. dlh m:t\ 
t>l\ph1 i 1 1  t lw 1"1'\t'l ,.1l 1 n  ·r ahk D. \1'1• '"I'm 1c'1 ·'' r ompannng 11e •w 4:'>. 
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C<lll l l l l l  liglnly gt·twt·alizc r l l<:> re-sults �·ro11 1 behavior i11Volving slllall  -;takes to 
bt'll<n i ( l r  it1voking largt· gambles. As l11v'W C<HI[ions makt" clc<lr. we do t l t ll 
claim rhat our research clncl anal�'sis arc conclu·ivc with re-;pe-cr LO the effecL'i 
of tlncenaim�- Rather. wr highlight the i m portance and l t'le,·anc-e of' 
uncenai n c>· and begin lO explore the h·ays unccnainry co11 ld be mani pulated 
to reduce the costs or operating the kgal system without reducing its 
deterrent effects. Toward that end, the next Parr anal�?.es rhe tre-atment of 
U t lce:nainty i n  ton and criminal Ia''' and -;uggcsts ways rhat policy makers 
could use uncertainLy to i ncrease deterrence. 
llT.  L:\CF.RT:\1!\!TY 101 CRI�liN.-\1 . .-\i\D TORT L\\\' 
Our experi m e n tal results suggest that uncerrainry in sanctioning 
in creases deterrence, at lt>ast within the conditions that we i t1\'Cstigated. I n  
this Pan, we acldre s the treatment of tmcenainry under exi ·ting ton and 
crirninal law, beginning with the anomal}' that we noted in the introduction: 
namelv, that criminal and ron law borh attempt ro reduce uncertainty with 
respect to the si;.c o f  the sanction and largely ignore uncertainty in 
detection. This anornal;; reflects a discernible legal ethos that, nevertheless, 
leaves ubstantial room for policy makers to exploit the deterrent 
possibilities of uncenainrv ("\·en i n  euing sanction . 
Cl-iminal  law differe ntiates sharply between certainry with respect to the 
size or the sannion and cenainry with respect to the probabilit)' of detection. 
Criminal law has mechanism-; designed to increase certainty with respect tO 
the size of the sannion. bttt i t  typically does not regulate certainty with 
respect to the probabilitv <>f detection. 
1 .  Uncenaimy Regarding Sanction i n  Criminal Law 
There are many rules i n  criminal law that are explicitly designed tO 
address uncertainty with respect to the size of a sanction. These rules follow 
in part from the fundamental principle that an individual i entitled to know 
in advance the content of criminal prohibitions as well as the sanctions for 
violating them. The prohibition on retroactive changes i n  the criminal 
sanctions pro,'icle a paradigmatic example. Imernational documents, such 
as Seetion 1 1  (2)  of the Uni,·crsal Declaration of Human Rights and Section 
7( I )  of the European C<Hl\'t'Jnion of HU!nan Rights, prohibit rhe i m position 
of retroactive sanction for new offenses, or retroacti,·ely i ncreasing the 
sanctions for existing offenses. irnilar provisions can be found i n  numerous 
constitutions, including in Article I, Sections 9 and LO of the U n i ted States 
Constinaion, Article 10:�(2) of the German Constiwtion, and i n  Section 
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1 1  (g) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms."'' A n·'lat<"d principle 
of c•·iminal law-the p•·i n cipl e of lenity-also increases th<' certainty of the 
CJi minal sanction. According to the principle of leniry, a criminal statute 
must be strictly construed and any doubt regarding tl1e size of the anction 
must be resolved in favo•· of the defendam.1;;, Finally, one of the stated 
objectives of the Model Penal Code has been "to give fai r  warning of the 
natUJ·e of me sentences that may be imposed on convinion of an offense.'.61; 
This objective was a ce-mral reason for the move i n  the U n i ted tates toward 
determinate sentencing exemplified by tl1e adoption of detailed sentencing 
guidelines.m To sum up. i t  seems that in Western legal systems. certainty i n  
64. These provisions f.>n>hihn bor l i tlw I'Ciroanive imposition of llt>l\' prohibitions and the 
rc1roactive inneasc· in the sanc1ion. Our Article dc;tls only with the lam·r a�ptxt. 
65. U nited States v. Wiltlx·rger. I �  LS. 76, 95 ( ll:l20). I n  sonH:jurisdinions. the CC)JnlliOll 
lt�w rule of strict construction has been mclifit-d . .  \1'(• FL-\. STAT. Al'N. !:i 77:1.021 ( I )  {West 2002) 
(4The provisions of thi� cod!' . . . �h.�ll br srl'iclly const rued; when dw language is )>II�Ct'plible of 
different consu1.1ctions it shall h,- constnred mos1 favor<'tbl)' to the accused."). llw rule of kni1 1· 
is often justified on 1he gmund� thai Citizens have a 1·ight to be tJoti !led of tht' content of 
criminal prohibitions a:. wdl as thc �i�;c of 1he sanctions imposed for \'iohllinK tht'!ie 
pmhihitions. SrP Liparma '. llnm·cl Statt>s. 4 71 U.S. -119.  427 ( 19g:>): Uniu·d Stat('s , .. J3a.,�. 40-1 
U.S. :·t)6, 347-4R ( 1 9 7 1 1 .  Fot· a discus.-;ion of the rule of lenity, �e�· 1-{t'IWralh Dan M . .Kahan. 
I.Puily and /·prfnal r:ommrm !.aw C:mn1·1. I �19-1 Sl 1'. CJ . RE\·. :�-1:1 ( 19�H). 
66. �10D�L PE�At . 0 li)F !:i I .O:?tl) C d )  ( 1 962). 
67. Sr r ROt;F.R W. I I  \l:'<h F'l -\I .• FF.I)F.RAL SE:-.TENCI.\1<: GLIIDEI I 'iES H.\:--:DnOOJ.: 1-2 ( 199�). 
MICI IAEI. TOt-:RV, St-: TF!'\1 :1�1. !\1.\'n ERS 1 (I ( 1 996). Tlw L'.S. Sen tencing ( :omn1ission i1sdf (tlw 
com1 n ission that i:-. in chargt· . .  r drafting tht' sentencing guiddines) t'ln phasllt'd tht' imponann· 
of cenainry. ln explaining i1.-< rlbjt-niws. it stt�t�d th:-u: "A sentencing �ysH·m 1:ri lon·cl 1o fit t''t·n 
ronct>i,·t�ble wrinkle of t·ach c<��t· "·oulcl quickly hec0111<' ur1Wt1rkablt· and :-.t·riou!'ly conrpmmist· 
tilt' certainty of punishntcl l l .llld ib cklcl t t•nt etT..-ct.'' .\1•1' U.S. SENTE:'\1'1�<: CO:>IM .,. FEOER.-\1. 
ENTF.:-<t:l'lt: MM-Ill:\1 ch. I p1. ,\_:) ( I !J�J:"i). (llloiloh/r a/ hrtp://l'"''''.tL'i..�C.)to\'/ I Y9!'iguid 
GU I OET t\B. HTM. Yt•L otl1ct 1 <Ji< <'-" ha,·c ;argued t hal the primary aim of :;t>n t..-ncmg guicklhw� 
is not to promote cenaittt�· btl l  ttl rt>diiCt' diSf.><llity in St'lll<"ncing. EciH><-s 1o this vic"· can also lw 
found in the- sentencing gtuckluw.s manual which staH's that 0111' of' tht' .. thret> ol�jccti\(·s 
Congress sought to achielt· 1 1 1  <'llacting th� Semcnring Rdorm Act ol 19X-l" wa� ·n·;lsonablt­
uniformity 1 1 1  st'nltHCittg )),· ll:liTl l\\'1 111-\' 1hr ,,•ide disparitv in st-tll<.:llf't'S imposnl for similar 
criminal oflense commancd b" similar ollt-nders." !d. 
Tht"�c two o�ji'C'ti\1·:- .Ill:' distinn. It i:- pos.�ibk '" have C<'nai n '"'H dons. :t11cl :1\ llw 
samt" linw m.tilllain di�p:u m among different i ncli11duab. II indi1i dual A kn<Ms that If 
convinerl ht will be s<·n lt'll <'t>d In X wars in prison and indidd 11al H knows 1l1at if �lw '" 
convicrc-d �h<' "·ill b<' St·nten• cd to Y. tlwn th<." s<tnction� art' ··cenain� and I t-t til.- S\'Str·m 
m�tin�;tinl' d1�paritY. \t·t. dH·"· ,,,." 11b)'•(lin·s ( rt"naintl' on tlw <lnt• h.tnd .uHI c·lintin:rnng 
disparit\ on the <>llwr lt.tnd 1 ;�rc• oftc·n llltt'rdqwndent. fht· Sc:nlC·tJCing R.-lorm .-\1 1 of I �):--i-1 
r('cognil.t'�< ilus Jnt(•rdqWtldc·nce :tncl 111 <-ll lions bo1h of 1hc·m 1ugc1llt'r "" prunarY objn·tiiT,.. 
Tlw U .S. C:oclc· r\n notawcl ;.uH·,. 1h:u Oil(' of 1he ol�J<'< l in·s uf dw .\< 1 '" 10 ··prm ick rca taint\ :llld 
fainwss rn mee1 ing 1 Ill' ptu p• >-'l'S of �<·IHenring. I h1 l aHlldtng nnw:n t.llllc•cl M'nl<'ll< mg 
disparili•·s .nnong d<·ft>nclaltl� 1\ith "intilar records whn ltaH· bt·t•u lottnd gui lt\ qf �i mil:n 
Cllllllll<tl <OIIdllrt ." 1B l'.�.< . .. \. ;:i �)�II ( h ) (  l l ( B l  (\<\'•·�t 200�). 
Th,·rc· '" ol rour�.- a --.·p:rratc• da�pul<' a� to 1\'ht-dwa dtt· s.·ntenc tng gnidd irw� ntdc·•·d 
aclt wn· 1 hc· goals !Ia' I .11111 :11 .whic•1ing . .  )1'1' SPill I�. '11/JI o not•· �II. : 1 1  :z:J,t •-:\• 1; � 1 I l l  I �- ( : \IlK \:-.1 :-.. 
'll/JIYJ now �o. :11 1 04--12. I )Jic• i t l l <'rc·�nng fi nding 1lt:11 r�ri,.es donb1" :thtHII llw ,11, . ..,,,.,. of tlw 
�l"lllt'I1C111g gllrd..Jtnc·, j, ilJt' f:u I 11Ja1 J li'C ISI'CIIIDI':O. and ddt'lld:ttllS C'IICIIIIl\C'Ill ilw 1'1''11'11 1i011� h1 
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;.;e:-n tencing i:-. considered an i m ponan t oqjecti,·e and t t umerous doctrines 
atT designed to ach ieve that certainty. 
2. Uncertainty Regarding Detection i n  Criminal Law 
\'\'e do not observe the sam e  attention ro reducing unce-rtainty 
regarding the probability of detection in criminal law. In large pan, this may 
lw attri butable to insti tutional factors. The crim ina l j ustice system se parates 
ittstitutional rcsponsibi l iry for different aspects of the der:ection of criminal 
aCI'\. Police and other law enforcement agencies are responsible for 
surveillance and arrest; prosecutors are responsible for deciding whether 
and hmv to prosecute ; and judges and j u ries are responsible for decidi ng 
,,·hether the evidence is sufficient to convict . While overly sim pl istic,''� this 
de-scription highlights the faCL that a variety of instiwtions are involved in 
deteCLing crime and that, while courts are hardly peripheral to the detection 
process, they do not play as central role in de tection as they do in 
sentencing. This lesser role of courts is i m portant because, in ge neral , the 
rnore removed an actor is from the inside of a courtroom, the less the legal 
system tends to constrain action. Thus, as a matter of institutional reality, 
<"enainty in de tection will tend ro be affected more by "policy" than "law" 
(recogn izin g  that we are drawing to some degree an artificial distinction ) ,  at 
least as com pared to certainty i n sannion . 
The existence of agencies specifically responsible for detecti ng crime 
makes i t  possible for the criminal justice system to address explicitly the 
public's perception of the cenainty of detection in a way that, at least 
potential ly, distinguishes criminal law from tort law. It is our impression, 
however, thar, on the whole, Ja,., enforcement agencies' deterrence strategy 
focuses more o n  (i n creasi ng) the probabil i ty of detection than on the 
certainty of the probability of det:enion. Thus, the efforts invested in 
generating certainty with respect to the size of the sanction are not matched 
by similar efforts to address certainty with respect to the probability of 
detection. The former climension-cenainty "vith respect to the size of the 
sannion-falls within the ambit of concerns about the "rule of law,·· while 
the latter dimension is merely a matter of "policy." Wh ile this di fferential 
treatmem of certai n ty with respect to these two dimensions may seem 
natural to some and puzzling to others, all would agree that the lack of 
certainty "vi th respect to the pmbabi li ty of detection receives little or no 
auemion. 
t'll�aging in more pre-charging charge bargaining. See Ahmed E.ssam Taha. The Elfens or the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines on the Disposition of Criminal Ca:;es 100-0:� ( 1996) 
( unp11hlished Ph. D. clissenation. Deparunem of Economics of Stanforcl Un i,·ersi ty) (on file 
with the Iowa Law Review). 
68. Prosecutors are in lacr often involvecl in surveillance and arres1 and, t h rough plea 
IMrgaining, they ran also hecome- judge- ami jury 
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3. Manipularjng Unccnainry in  Criminal Law 
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Given that we are suggesting that policymakers should consider 
manipulating cenainty in order to increa. e deterrence, the onus is on us ro 
demonstrate that this is possible. Hence, in this section '"e \viii suggest some 
ways in which certainty in sanction size and detection can be manipulated 
\·Vithout subverting legal doctrine, or betraying the legal ethos.6Y 
Sanction Si.ze. Criminal law often aurho1izes officials to u e their 
discretion in setting sanctions. How official· use thi discretion can increase 
or decrease cerrainty with respect to the size of the legal sanction. Although 
determinate sentencing reduces the discretion of judges, it does not reduce 
the discretion of police and prosecutOrs. Most notably, prosecutors retain 
discretion to charge offenses up or down.''' In addition, broad grants of 
federal criminal jurisdiction in the Uni1ecl States can expose defendants who 
commit identical crimes to disparate sentences depending on wherhe1· they 
69. V.1lile this senion focust>s on the cenaint" uf the sanc1ion and the precision of 1he 
prl)babilil) 11f de1ec•ion, what b uhimatelv cr-ucial foJ de1nrence is not cenairll\ itself but tlw 
belief., ol pot<.:Jltial criminals regarding ccnaintl. Y.:l, "�'Luning that tlwre is a Cl)n·el;uinn 
betWCC'II (( ..rtainty and beliefs of potenlial crimi11<ll!-- "ith n·�peCl to <'ertaint)', this section focu�t·:­
nn tht' lllechanisms for manipula•ing certaintY. 
In addition to manipulating belit·fs t<>ncerning the C<.:naintr of tht· sanction and 
bdit:ls concerning the precision of the pmbahilitl' of clt'tection. the legal systetn can al��' 
manipulat.- the beli.:fs concerning 1he a1·erage :.iL<' of the s::mnion and the average probabili11 
of det<:<'tion. In a classic anide. Meir Uan-Coh.-n ar-g-uecl that tlw leg-al SI"Stem nmtain� t\\'U 
�epara1e v�tems of norms: une acldn.:s:.t-d to lht' rriminab and tht· :.t'Cond addres:-.�·d tu judg{·:.. 
\'lcir Dan-Cuh<>n. 01rision Rull'� ond r.ondttd Hu/1'' Un :\cou�tir Sl'jJamtion in Crimi11al !.mo. �17 
H:\R\'. L. RF\'. 625 ( 1 9H4}. Under his ,;e"·,judgt'' upt"ralt' a more knient and forgi1ing S\'�tt·m 
of nurm than those that are bclk1·ed bY the public '" guide jtJdicial dt-cbions. Au -acou:;Ji, 
separation" bet\\·een these tWl> :,y:-rt'lll� of 111)1 nt� ){U.tr..tnl<'t-:. thai llw norm� 11·hich an: aclltall1 
oper;�le:-d by junges will not be 1he ones knmvn to tht' public a1 large. A similar ;.chemt" coulrl 
ptThaps lw established ll'ith respt-Cl to the probabili1y of detection. The police could create 
"acoustic separation" between the anual prob<�bility of dctt'rtion and the belief or •he 
probabilirl' of de-Jection used by indi,·iduals to guide their behal'iOr. In other wot·ds, dte police· 
could 111anipulate a false belief 1hat llw rate of deH"rllon i much higher than i1 b i n  realit1. 
So111e advocates or behal'ioral la11· anci eronomic� hal'e suggested wavs to creal<' Jabl· 
belief.� concerning the probability of deteni<Jn. i\'lon· specifically, .it was poimcd out th.tl 
inciividttab tend ll) j11dge tht' l ikt·lihood or lii\Ct'rtain l'l't'llL� ( \IC'h as gcuing c:lllglll altl'l' tht· 
commb.sion of a n inw) by h0\1' <tl'ailabit' such in'>tdnrt·s are to 1he hum.:�n minci. Thi:- an.th·!-.i.'-
uggest.s 1he dt·sif<lhilil\. from a prl'srriptil'e s1andpoim. of making l<11, enfc>tTt>ITll'lll highh' 
1·i�iblt· ..tnci thert>b\ creating fabl" lwliet� ll'illl n·�p�"n to 1he probabilill' nf dc:�t·rtion 
Con!-.equellll'. i1 \1';\� daimc-d thai 1he practice nl .. ,ticking large. brighth-colnred tickt'l!'- 1h.11 
n·ad '\'10L-\TIOI'\' in large lencrs nn the dri,t'r�· 'id<· ll'ind•J\1', where the1 art· patticul,uh' 
IHHic··abll" 111 rlrin'r� pa);sin)!; b1·.- ts bcllt"r th;m the k!'� costly approach ("p11t1111g .-,m:lll. plt�in 
licket:- ttndet llw ll'tnd�htcld ll'iper c1n 1hc: curh :-.ich· ol 1he �•ret·t, a piJre th:lt 1' 1 ollll'tllt'lll f t �t  
tlw pa1 king •>lflcet 10 reac-h'' ) Chn-,line Jolls t-1 t�l.. A BPIUiliiOml AjJJnvnrh tn l.m• nnd F.11momn,. 
5U S'l ·\:--:. L. Rl-T. 1- !71.  1 538 ( l <J98) . .JutlgL' Posnet COIIIHert>d that til<' large stick<·• mil� haw 1he 
nppo-,i le d f't.>Ct by drJwing attCtllinn to lHJ\\' llllt t'C]IIt•lltly d1·H•ni<1n anually •H < ur:. Ru·h:11 d 
p,,�f \ 1:' 1 .  Natiounl C:hout', Belunlfma( l:tlllllillllr.\, (11/f/ tlu· l.uw. :'10 S'IA:--:. 1.. Rl· \'. 1 � :'> 1 .  ) -,;,:\ t l!l�li'l . 
71l. Thi:. )JVII('t i' ust-<.1 •>!It'll 111 <'l':tde I hi" �t'lll<"IH iug guidl"litw� . . �'''' C!·t.lld \'\' H1·.ttw1. 
l?n•tl!lill_t! f>ll/111111\ /Mmi/IIJ!. (;tmfrlllul ''11'11/1'1/Uif,l!.. ��� ·\�1 ( .1�1.\1 1.. Rl-\ . 771. 77� t l 'l�l�l 
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arc pm-;vnlled b}· the slate or by the l'ed<.T,d );O\Trll lHetlt.  \1\'ht·t t Rudolph 
( ;iuli<Jni was tlw United State� :\uorne�· in . <.'W York. hf' used tlw cunrutTetH 
ju ri�din io tl to create a se t nen cing lonery. Hi.s plan invoked a J.Jrogram i t t  
which one clay was chosen at random each week when a l l  street level drug 
dealers apprehended by local authorities would be prosecuted in federal 
courr and cons<.:quentl; "ubjt""Cted to han;her sanctions. Ruclolph Giuliani 
c·xplicilly t'tnbrarcd t he dctcrretll  pos<;iiJiliries of <;t·mencing lotteries ,,·hen 
he .slated: "the idea was to cre;tle a Russian roulette effect. "
71 
L.cgal ducrr·ine can abo i ncrease or clecrea c cenaitH\. For example. i f  
sanctions are smaller for attempts than completed crimes, there is 
ut tC<:'I'Laimy, ex ante, wil11 respect to the size of the sanction. vVhen a person 
stans com1nining a crilllt', si t<.· cannot know in advance whether the crime 
will be completed successfully or not. Thus, she faces a "s('ntencing lottery·· 
of o;orts.7� Similarly, "entenccs sometimes depend on the degree of ·uccess of 
the person in commiuing the crime. Some penal prm�sions i m pose 
diffcremial sanctions i n  accordance with the amount of money or property 
stolen or other factor unknown to the perpetrator of the crime at the time 
the crime is comrnittecl.
7•1 
Finally, the "Pinkerton rule," \Vhich makes 
criminals liable for t.h e ans of their co-conspirators. similarly i mposes a 
sanction according to l�tctors that are not known LO the perpetrator at the 
t ime the crime is rom m i ned. More panicularly, each co-co nspirator bears 
the ri k thm other co-conspirators will commit further un plan ned crimes." 
These rules are often considered to leave the fate of offenders to 
contingencies that are bevond their powers and therefore are considered 
. ;r. Ul�JUSL 
7 1 .  Sat�t Bt><tle. Too Mnu\ nud 'lim hw: ,VntJ fJI.inripll'.� to DPjinl' lhl' J>ropn l.imiB for Fi·de-ral 
Crimejuri.1dir1ion. -l(i 1-l.·\..'i !  It--:< ::-. l..f. 979, 1000 ( l!:J95}. 
7'2. A simpl e c::xampk t .ln i l luMrate how a leg:.tl S)'Stt:m can manipulate c::enaint)' by 
changing its treaunettl of :tlll'lltpts in a way th�H is condncive w t:'fficiency. As.sttntc that iJO% of 
tht crirnin<Jls who !>t;tn w tnmnttt :t crime complete the crime succt'sstitlly . . �untt: that I 0% of 
all crintit tab an· dettcted and 'ttt'<'t'""fully convicted. There are t\,·o ways w illlpttst: an expected 
sanction or ten year ... in prison. L ' trdt·r the lit-:;t scheme, both those who rPmmit complett' 
crimes and those who lailerl l<• tnrnplt:tt: them receive ten years in prison. Unclet the second 
scheme. tlto�e whu attt'tnpt to rc nt llnit ..t crime recei,·c ftvt- yc::ar· while those \vhu complett'd the 
crime receive ftftet:'n yt:.trs. f11 huth ,themes. the cl'iminal faces a sanction of th(· '<I me expected 
value (ten rears).  The dt·sn .thiln� ul each one <>f these schemes depends. hc Mt>ver. (H1 the 
ani tude of' the crim in;1b t< • Lllll t·n.ti r tl\. I r criminals are risk-averse. tht' St'C<>ttd �chc.:mc \viii likdv 
be more t::l'f't'cti\'t' than tht: fi r"t. 
73. Set gl'lwmlly Hard & 'iq(<ti. '11/'m nott' 8. q: United Sratcs v. Feola. ·1'20 U.S. 671, 69-l­
��:·, (holding that Ollt' C<tll 'iol.ttt' ,1 'l<llllle criminalit.ing a.ssaull.'\ on fC'dt:ral ofllct't,., t'Vt:n if one 
does not know that tht: ,·ictint i,., ,1 p<•lice officer); MODEL PE:-o;:\L. Co or. ::; '2.0'2 ( I  �ti'l) (srnting 
that the:: men� rea rc::qnirttncnt,., ,tpph· only tO the material elementS of a tritnt:). 
74. See !'\eal Kumat IZ.tf'<tl. (;,,,,1/Jirary Theo1y, l t 2 YALE LJ. 1�07, 1363-6·1 (2003) (using 
the dett'rn:m effect of tlllC't'l t<tll\1\ ,1, a ju�tiftcaLion fnr the Pinknton rule}. 
1:1. Tht: case of tltc l'111krrtoJI 111le is e,·en more diswrbing in that tlte !'ate of Ollt' offender· 
i:-. at th<.: h;lllcb nl othl·r�. \\ ,. rtta\ he willing tO tolerate smne citTtllll�tann:s in which 
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Probability oj DetP.rlion. The abil ity of law <�nl orcc:-ment agencies t o  
manipulate the cenainty o f  t h e  probability o f  d{'tenion vat-ies according to 
context. One arena i n  which it seems quite po sibk is taxpayer compliance. 
Tax law enforcement is based largely on i nvt:stigating a representarive 
sample of potential offe nders. The more thC' criteria for auditing and the 
si7.e of the sample are publicized, the more cena i 1 1  the:- detection rate. Prior 
behavioral decision research on taxpayer complia11ce suggest. that, provided 
d1at sufficiem taxes have been withl1eld from wagt::s. reducing the certainty 
of the probabi lity of detection ,..,,oulcl increase' taxp<l\t'r (ompliance.ili 
Enfo rcement of parking laws (or perhaps other traffic violations) is 
another arena i n  which cena.inty could be affecr cd �imilad,·. Many citizens 
are exposed on a daily basis to the enforcement of traffic and parking laws 
and can dewlop expertise with respect to their enrorcemc-nt.  For example, a 
municipality could decide to send parking inspectors rq,rularly to all  
neighborhoods or i t  could decide to concentrate its efforts on differenL 
neighborhood. on different, t·andomly seknt·d chH·s. The Iauer system 
creates greatt>r uncertainty with respect w t h e  probabi l ir; of detection. A 
parking enforcement agency could change the cenaintv of detection b�· 
announci11g (and then following through on the C\llnounc<:ment) that it was 
going to adopt a less (or more) predictable parking ticket enfotTeme n t  
pattern. 
CenaiJHY can also be manipulated in other areas t h rough tht> use of 
enforcement campaigns. In an enfor-cement campa ign , a Jaw enfot-cem ent 
agency targL'lS its  resourct>s in a specific grograph i c area or on a speci fic type 
of offen�e. If increasing u n certainty i ncrease� de-terrence, a policy of 
t>nfurcement campaigns would produce great<"r deterrence than a policy 
that allocated a constant stream of resourct's to {:nforct'mt' t l t  by geographic 
area or type of offense.;' An enforcemt>nt campaign increase. t h e  
uncertainty of t h e  probability o f  detection b� publicizing the fact  that, 
sometimes, the probability of detection will be wry high. AJthough the 
rontingt•nriv, a�t· b<·vond 1he pow.:r of nflenc.ler� and ,.,.1 "·�i:-:1 rir( 111l1SI.inre� in wilirh 1llt'�t' 
conting.:nrit·� art> r"mrolkd b,· o1her ag-e Ill"· 
76. Su· n,�.,wtf IJI'Irm·nrt•. �uf)ra nolt> 7. a1 1-l-10-4 1 .  lntc'l t'.'llllgh. thb research :-ugg.-�b that. 
,,·ht·n 1101 enough mone,· ha� been "'ithheld from inc.onw 10 p;.�� IZ!X('S, unrntainl' tmt\ 
derrt-ase 1axpan-r unnpliance. rlur- 10 lht· lc>,�'gain lrammg dku. Sn· Iff. a1 X:l-1-:!:i. \\"hr-n 
t'IHlllgh mmw' h,,,. htTil withheld. che-ating produces <J ··g-.1111--a.,· .. ,1 largt'l n·fund: 1d1t·n nor 
c-ncmgh mcmn ha� benl ,,·i1 hlwld. dw:ning prorlnn:� J "nMikr ··to,.�··-1.<' .. :t ,m:"llit-1 .u!dincm.ll 
ta:-. paylllc:-11 1. rill" l t'�('<lrrh Mtggt·,..l:- 1h:11 laxing :1111horiiin C:lll inCr<'.tH" l Olllpli<Hit t• b\ 
ex1n1ding ,,·i1hhnld1ng 1 11h·s :mel )),· antHillllc 111g thai 1 ht·\ '-ill Jncu' .111d11' nn l.t:-.pawl' li!..c·h ilr 
h;l\e lll(Olllt• 111.11 I' IIIII �llhjt·c· l I ll \\ilhlwlclillg. 
1 1. L' n< t•n :111m ,_-j 1 h rt·spt>ll 1o 1 he pn,babihtv ol dc·H-clion '" abo aflt-ciNl. :tliJcll I<J .1 
lt·:<.-.f'r t'XI<"lll in p• at I I <  t' lt> b.- Milt". b' 11la1llpub1ing alit" 1 c·ll oa< 1 h  il\· nl 1 hangc' i1 1  p1 '" t·dural 
and t<vidt'lllla" rult-,.. II Lilt· rhangt'� 1 1 1  t•\ ult:lli iM' .end pruc nlll!al nllc:-" (fltild l w  .tpplic·d 
rc-lloanh·t·h . . 1 pc·r;;on wh11 1 11111111i1� .1 1 rinw would t.u e mcn·;c:.c·d nnn·rt.tllll\ .dl111JI l lw 
probabilil\· ol c 1111\lc l l<Jil. A ln�al ''"Inn thc·rt•lnlc>. c 1111ld g;tJll ( t•ll,lllll' il it r,.,JI I I l <·d : 1  .. pri•H 
\\.trning" \\·llh ".'I"·( I I<> J>l•>«"dlll.d :tnd t•\lclc·llli:c" a u lc·'· 
K9 lOW·\ L \  W Ul:T/f\V f�OlHJ 
public pn:sunntbly i .  aware rhat Ia\\· e- n forcement officials cannot consisle>nr l�' 
!ll<lilltain a high probabilit) of deteCLion i n  e\·ery time a11d place, the facr 
that ·ometi me<; the probability will be \'er;· high means that there i · a  \vider 
range of potential probabi lities of detection in any particular time and 
[-)lace. Thus. enforcement campaigns have the potential to increase 
deterrence. given fixed resource , not onlv by publicizing the fact or Ia\.,. 
enforcement activity ( tl1ll: recruitillg liH.: "availability heuristic" lO ·uppon 
Ia\\· e:::nforcement effons) -;,; but also by i n creasing the uncertainry regarding 
1he probabilirv of detenion. 
Ton law also differentiates between the treatment of uncenainrv \vith 
respect to the anction on the one hand and uncertainry with re pen lO the 
probability of detection on the other. Uncertainty with re:-gard w sanction is 
addressed direcrly by the law of tort damages and, indirectly, by liability 
insurance. ,1\Jthough tort law's compensatory purpose i n troduce a n  
inescapable elcmem of uncertainty i n t o  t h e  expected value o f  wn sanctions, 
liability insurance substamially reduces that uncenainty. [ n contrast, 
u n cenainl) wi1h r<"g���-d ro detection is nor addressed ar all. 
l .  L' ncenaimy Regarding Sanction i n  Ton Law 
l n  tort law, que tions of sanction are addressed under the general 
heading of ··ctamage .'' At the level of legal doctrine. tOrt law appears less 
concerned \\'i t h  reducing uncerta i n ty in sanction than criminal law. Thi 
doctrinal difference follows from the compensation and victi m-cemered 
focus of wn damages (as opposed to criminal sanctions) . Because of the 
focus on the harm w the victim, i t  is often quite difficult for a potential 
tortfeasor to kilO\\' in ach-ance the amoum of damages that would be assessed 
in the evem o f  detection. One dramatic example of this is the "eggshell 
skull'' rule, pursuant to which the defendant is responsible even for 
unforeseeable harm to a foreseeable victirn .;9 A second dramatic example 
comes frorn the liability provi ions of the tatutory lOrt created b)' the 
Comprehensive Environmemal Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLr-\).'�11 Pu rsuant to CERCLA, a person who shipped only a small 
amount of hat.ardous 1vasre to a site can be jointly and severally liable for the 
clean-up of the elll ire site, even i f  the person _reasonably believed that the 
waste \vas not hat.arcluus.�q 
78. Ser Jolb l"l .11.. 'up1n note 69. 
79. St'l' gl'lu•rally B<:nn ' · Thomas, 5 1 2  N.W.2d 537 (Imva 1994) (discuss1ng lhe "eggshell 
skull" rule uf ton ht"'). 
80. 42 U.S.C. �� �l()(} l -9674 (20UO). We thank Kurt Strasst"t ro1 ak·ning tiS to the 
�·nvironmental l.t'' i•nplit;llllHls or 0ur re earch. 
R l  !d. 
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Notwithsrandillg r h i  doctrinal difference berwet'n ron and criminal 
law, in practice> ron o;anctions ordinarily are much more c�nain than 
criminal sanctions-at least from the perspective of the defendant-because 
of liability insurance. If liability insurance is available. ir near!�· eliminates 
uncertainty in ton sanctions from the perspective of an insured tort 
defendant. Providecl that he or she has purchas�d adequate liabiliry 
insurance, the cost w the defendant of a ton judgment will alway be 
approximately the same: the opportunity costs of the time pent c:ooperating 
in the defense. along with the associated aggravation and inconvenience.
s2 
Of course, liability insurance does not entirely eliminate uncertainty from 
the defendant's per pective. There are other costs to bt-ing a ton defendanr, 
and it is always possible that r h e  insurance company will partially recoup the 
damages paid in the form of higher premiums in the furure. ev�nheless, i n  
practice, liability insurance very substantially reduces uncertainty regarding 
sanctions, at least from the perspective of potential tort defendant . 
ln addition to tht> uncertainty-reducing effecr of liability i n  trrance, 
there are also aspects of ron docu·ine that reduce the uncertainty of tort law 
remedies. For example, in tort law there is an implicir, but ,·ery strong. 
relationship between rhe oqjective measurability of' categories of tort 
damages and rhe degree of difficulty in obtaining those damages. The 
easiest elements of a ton damages case are r h e  out-of-pocket losses 
(sometimes called economic losses), such as medical expenses and lost 
wages. The caregories of damages that are more difficult to calculate, uch as 
pain and suffering or loss of enjoyment of life. are more difficult to collect. 
Indeed. tort Jaw only grudgingly permitted such "non-economic" damages, 
and their continued availability i under constant thr<"at from ron reform 
X'l 
efforts to place caps on non-economic damages. · 
82. Liability insuranrt' typically covers the costs of defense a� '''ell a!> 'enlcrnetll or 
judgmc:>nt. En:n puniti\t: damages an: insurable in many juri�dirtion�. John B. Canatal!'a . .Jr .. 
Offo;horl" lnsuranrt' for Puniti,·e Damages 10 (2002) ( unpublishnl I.Livl. lht·M�, L:niwr:.it\' ot 
ConneCticut School tJf 1."'') (<>Jt llle '''ith lhe JO\,'rt I ..a"' Revie'' ) 1 "Currl'nth t\,·cnC\-Se\'en state� 
pennit rm·cragc. in one way or anmher. for punith·c damage:..-) . .  �t·t· J;I'IU'I'IIIIy Tom Baket, 
&consufl'ring ln�uranrr Jnr Punitivr Damages, 199R Wrs. J. .  R.l:\. 1 0 1 .  In jnrisclirtic >n:. in ,,•hirh 
punithe damages ar(' not insurabk. a puniti,·e d<tmagcs ca_ e is mon· likch to St>Hle Thi� 
pranire reduce!' tlw uncenaint)' that is otherwise created by the publi< policy against insuranct> 
f(•r punith·e damagt-.s. SI'I• Tom Bak�'r. Trausjormi11g Pu11iJinnmt into ComjJt'lllfltion /11 tht• Shrufou• nj 
Punitil'l' /)(lmrtge.s, l9�1R \\'!'). l.. RE\', 21  I ,  2 1 1 .  It is ,,·onh nming th<lt l<ll'g<' corpuralions <1re ablt" 
to p111-cha.�i" insuranC<' products that cow•1 punitin· damages asses�Nl c-,·,·n in j�trisdinions in 
,,·hich �u('h damage� Mt', .t.� a lonna] maner. not insurablt>. Se1 C :Mtalalsa. 111/Hn • .11 28--14 
(discus,ing "off:�hnr<' '''�'"paround" insurance p11lines). En·n if tht' ctef('ndant has not 
purcha!>cd adequaw insuranc �"· the chances that the deft.>ndatll ,,.,u lw rt>qu ired to pa' am 
mone� from hi!> or h<'r 0\\11 pocket 111 <�n ordinan twgligenn· ton ca,,.. .tJc· 'mall .'iei' Tom Baker. 
Blood ,\/Qm;. . .\'n•• .\/rill") flllrf thf' ,\-Joml Eronom.' of Tmt l.nw 111 .-\rt1o11. 3:-l Lo\\\ & <.;or ·, Rf\. 275. 
277 (20(1 ] )  fhert'inaJ'tt-r Baket·. 13/ood .\ IIIII")' I. 
H:�. �·n· \o\', Kip \'iM "'i & Patnri.< 13orn . . \JI'fliwl .\ loljn'nlllll' 111\1/lflllf'l' 111 ffl,. \\ 'nkt• rJj l.mllllitr 
H,•jorm. �-1.) I .H.  \I '-;ll l 1 .J.f1:�. ·1 H-1 I I !19:1 ) 
-17(") 1 2004 1 
Pt l n i t i\ C' damctges are perhap.;; t h e  nwsL Uttcerrain of <til da1n ag-e-s. c;i net: 
1 heY an: rwt nece<;sarih riecl l0 th<' amount of hann i n flicted on anv 
p<u:riru lar plai n t iff".s 1  For tlti reason (among others), pun i tive damages are a 
ve q' comroH·rsial leature of l'.S. LOrt law.s; Feat ures of LOrt law thar reduce 
the uncenaillt\ r('garding puniti\'e ciamages inc l ude frequent decisions by 
trial courts to remit ( i .e. , reduce) the amounL of punitive damages. l n  
addi t ion , t h e  propensity for appel late courts to carefully scrut i n i ze and with 
some � requcnc' reverse punitive dama?:es judgn1ents encou 1·ages l i tigants to 
:-;enlt> pun i t i\'C:· damage case · bt>tween trial court and appeal .'"' 
2. Unn·-rmimy Regarding the Probabi li ty of Detection in Ton Law 
Otmide of  cou rt., ton law does not direcdy Clddress uncertainty with 
regard to cletecr ion . With the li mi tecl exception of statu tor)' torts, there are 
no publ ic agencies charged with detecting ton law violations (except to the 
exrenc that turt law overlaps with criminal law). Where such public agencies 
cxi t. it is our i m (.>ression that, l i ke crirninal jusLice institution , their focus is 
on ( i ncrea ·ing) r h e  probabi l i ty of detection. not the certai nty of t h e  
probabi l i ty o f  cletect ion .lli An addition al factor compounding t he 
uncertainrv of detection i n  tort law a compan·d to criminal lav.r is that, i n  
comrast w cri rni nal law, '·auempts" are n o t  actionable i n  tort. A breach of 
the relevan t lOrt law standard is grounds for legal action only if that breach 
cause:-. hann. I n  many. perhaps most. cases of n egl igence (or other civi l 
wrong" ) ,  llwre is at least some probabi li ty that the breach will not cause any 
harm . and ir ;;eents qui te l ikely that this probability will be uncertain. 
3. Manipulating Unce rtai nty i 1 1  Ton Law 
To ct degree. the com pensation goal of tort law l imits the ability to 
man ipu late Llw cenai nty with re pec t  to tht> . ize of the anction. On Lhe one 
hand , the C01 npe 1 1sation goal prevents sanctio11s front be ing certain, because 
ton damages depend on comi ngent faCLors. such as Lhe characteristics of the 
,·inim and the nature o f  the harm cau ·eel by t he wrongful behavior. On the 
other hand, r h e  compensat ion goal prevents sanctions from being radically 
uncertain. once again because the amount of ton damages depends on the 
harm. 
H·L fhl'l't' 1' ;1 lin·ly clcl:>att: about the untt:rUJilll\' <of pu1111 1\'C damage�. Set' gl'nemlly 
Tht'odo�t· C:i�t'll bt·rg- t-L al., jurie1. jtulgps and Pun ithw IJtwutg''' · . I 11 L-:mfliriral Study. 87 CORNELL l . .  
RE\. 7-t:� (�WO�); -\. �!itchell Polinsky. Art' Punitwl' Oamng,., l?l'alfy hnignifimnt. Predictable, and 
f<tr/rtottd? , I (.nlf/1111'111 1111 Hill'nherg el al., !l6 J. Lt::C·\1. S'f L D. ()()� I 1997). 
K:i. Sl'i'. P._!! .. 1Ufnn IIOte 2 ( .  
k!i ')1'1' i\lk hat•l .J. Rustad. L'nmvl'llutg J>unttiTif' /Jrunagl'': C:un·mt Ott/a and Fwtht.r lnquh)·. 
I��::< \•\ IS. 1.. R!· \ .  1 :i. 1•1 { 199H). 
:->7. Exarnpl<-·-. c.l �ucl1 agem:ics in tht: United St,ll(.'� incl11clt· ('(HlSumer prorcction divisions 
ot '\Lalt < .H tnn I('\' ){l'lH-1'<\ls. tht· Federal Tradt: Com 111 i:;�itlll. 1 ht· l-:11\'i rolllllt:ll tal ProLt::ctinn 
\g-t'lH'\', ,111cl 1 111' Fn( ld .rnd Dru� :\dmini�tration. 
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Yet, despite these l im i tat ions there are numerous ways by ,,·hich nne can 
man ipulate certainty in ron damages. One obvious mechanism is pun it ive 
damages. In gene ral, punit ive damage ar<" i m posed tO punish <kfendants. 
not to compensate victims, so there is no theoretical reason why punit iv<" 
damages need bear any particular relationship to compensatory damages.:;� 
Another obvious mechanism is liability insurance. vVhen liability 
inslll·ance is less available, ton sanctions are more uncerrain. For example, a 
lack of insurance for pu nit ive damages i n  some jurisdictions makes the 
prac(ical impact of puni tive damages more uncertain.:-;9 Similarly, the relative 
lack of insurance for envit·onmental harm makes the impacr of 
environmental liability more uncenain.\111 l n  addition, the i ncreasing!;· 
common practice of excluding coverage for claims relating to ··criminal acts" 
turns insurance companies i n t o  criminal law enforcement agencies of a sort, 
and at the same time makes ton sanctions more uncertain in case · involving 
CJ·iminal norms.u1 Finallv, dos<'ly tying t h e  future costs of liabilil:) insurance 
to paid tort settlements or j udgments ( known as "expe1iencc ra t i ng" in the 
insurance trade) would also i ncrease the uncertainty of torr damages. 
Certain!:)' i n  wn damage:-. may also be affected by rules regarding ton 
damages. 1any ·'ton reform" <:'fforLs are aimed at reducing the 11ppe1· l imit 
of wn damages and. thus, may make ton damages more ce-rtain. Example 
include restrictions on joi n t and scve,·al l iability and caps on non-eronomir 
or puni t ive damages '':? In addi t ion . the U.S. Supreme Court is dt·,·eloping 
consLi(utional limits on punitive damages t hat l imit  rhe jury's discretion 
regarding the size of such a\\'ards.!l:l One or the 1110St important implirations 
of our research in tht> ton arena is (hat the r{'duction i 1 1  uncertain !\ 
res11lting from t hese ton rc·lim11s may well magnify the ex pt·cted loss i n  
deterrence resulting from tht· dec l ine in t h e  amount o f  damage . . 
HR. Cf. State: Fan11 t\hu. Aut•>. In�. Co. ' · C :amplwll, :\48 L'. · . ..JO�. 1 2:� S. C1. J :d :'. J :-d!l-2! 
(200�) (s<;Jiing 1h;11 du<· pro< t'�' ' on�kkr.uion� mancla<t' rhat punitin� d,nn.t).{t'" nn<�l bt'.tr a 
n·asonable 1 dalionship 10 rompc·n:.,uorv dalll;.!!{t'. ): .-\. tvlitdwll Polin"b �- Stt·\"1:'1 1  Sh.ndl. 
Punitivr Damaf!"('.�: All fwnomit :\1/II�Hi\. I l l  H.-\R\'. 1 .. RE\ . Rli9. �NO ( 1 9�X) (arguinR rha1 pn11ill\t'  
cJam::tge� should 1w b:hcd on .t fo1 lll lll<� that rakt'' into .1r<nu111 romJWilsaron cl.un.tgt·, and rlw 
1ikt-lihoocl or unckr-enforrt'lllt'lll ). 
H9 St•r .\llfm' nole f\2 and .I( f<>lllJJitll\111� lt .. "\1. 
!Hl. ...,,,,, KF::>:;,.f.TJ ( AI\R_·�I I ·\\1. t.\;\ IRO:>::I.I(:'\ I'·\ I l .lAIIIUTY h.:-.I ·RA:-.< .F L·\\\ 1 'lX-:.'11� I 1 �'' " )  
91 :-;,,,. T0\1 8·\KF.R, ]'i..,l R\:'\n ] A\\' -\.''.:tl POl iCY 'itl:$-0:1 (�OIU) { c lhnh-,111)4 l i lt· t i�t· ol 
<'I i111inal t•xdu�ion� in 111�11r;11H t• IH •Iirk:-): \l't' n/\1/.)t•ll::llhall Simon. Co\t' l l llllg I hfl 111�h < :nnl<' 
1 91i:>-2000, a1 7-:�7 ( u npub1islwd m::I<HN'I i ] l l .  on li1t' Willi thi· lnwa l ..1w Rt'\tl"\\ ) .  
!12. Bl:'<'<lll�l· of li:thilil) iJhlll.lllt •·. i1 i �  ditlirnlt t o  kno"· 110\\' d w  ,,.,ti lting clc·n •··'"' 111 
lllll'l'rtaint' alh··< 1:- po1t'n1ial toll dc·lc-lld;utls. Prior l't'�t<<1n h Sllgg"t·'SI� 111.11 llll'l Jd< Jil11 d i < H "  r).,  
nn1 llt'Ct'�'arih 1cd1H e liabllit' in�tnann· ralt'S. "> 11 b p<l"-''hh- thai  1nn �t>l11nn c J . ,,., 1101 111 l.1e1 
dt'Ci t'a�t' IIIII t•J'l;illll\ lcll ltll'l dr-lt'Hci;tltl'. St'l' \'iq \bl & Burn. \lljlln 11<>11' s:� . . II lfi:�-�11 1  ( lilltll l l� 
1h:u m.tlpra• lie  t· rdnrm illn t':l�t·cl insnrr'l prnli1:1bi111' h111 cluJ 11111 � e·dllct'  in.<tll:llltc·  
pn·micnn�) 
!l'\ s,.,. <..;rate F.II'Ill \ t u r  . \ tllo l n,. < :o \ . ( .;tmplwiJ. :",-l:-\ l ' S tf iX \ �flll'>. l . 
-t/X I �00<-1 1 
;\ lanipulating t t n cenaint\' i n  dctt>cr iol t  is lt>ss straig-htfon�·ard in the LOt'! 
.t rc na 1 hc1. 1 1  in criminal justice because of Lhe imponancc of .. private" l<t\' 
enforct'mem in torts and the lesser role of public agencie ·. To the t'xtent 
that public agencies are charged with enforcing LOrt and related statulon 
nurrns. these agencies should be able to use all of the technique addressed 
i n  the niminal comext above. For example, an agen.cy charged \vith 
inuea:;ing patient safety in hospitals could conduct random, highly intensive 
audits of patient records to identifv adverse events, many of which would be 
unlike!\· ro ever ··esult in a pt-ivate rorr acrion becau e of historically verv lo,,• 
claiming rates i n  the medical malpractice arena.!'·' With regard to classic ron 
claims brought by individual plainr if(<;, however, there appears to be little 
that can be done, directly. to maniput;ue the certainty of detection. Eve tt 
with concerted efforts by members of the personal injury bar, intensive 
shon-term "enforcement campaigns" seem unlikely to be effective i n  
increa ing the uncertainty o f  detection. 
On the other hand, publicity highlighting the ·'tottery" or "random" 
nature of tort enforcemem may increase the deterrent effects of tort law i n  
fields i n  which the actual probability or detection i s  quite small. Medical 
malpractice may be one such example. Despite the facL<; that ( l )  a very small 
percen tage of adverse medical events result in a medical malpractice claim.!l:. 
( 2 )  doctors prevail in the majority of cases that actually go to trial,!lfi (3) 
rnedical malpractice insurance is not experience-rated,Yi and (4) doctors 
almost never have to pay money out of their own pockets,9x the threat of 
malpractice liability allegedly produce a great deal of "defensi\·e medicine,'' 
in which doctors perform additional te ·rs and take other precautions to 
�H. .'in· PACL WEILER ET AL., A y(EJ\Sl RF ()� M.\LPKACTICE: MEDICAL !�jURY, MAl.l'RACfiCI:: 
Ll I lt.XfiO�. AND PATIE�T COMPE;-.iSATIO� 12:1-�ti ( 1993): 
:VIalpractice law �eems to function in a manner akin to income tax audits. Only a 
�mall fraction of potemiali)' �alid malpra< ticc claims ever ripen imo la"·suit'>. 
HOI-'ever, clocwrs' inflated perceptions of the prospect of suit greatly magnify the 
deteiTent leverage that litigation can exert over medical malpractice, at lt:ast by 
comparison with what would be expened h ()Ill a simple calculation of the true 
statistical risk of suit. 
SI'P also Locatio et al., Relatinn Between i\lalpractt(t' Uazms and Adverse events Due UJ .VI'gligence. 325 
l'E\\' E�C. J. MED. 245, 24 7 ( 1991 ) ( rcponi ng th.H frwer than two percent of negl igcn rlv i1�un:d 
patients pursue litigation). 
\l:'l. See \>\.EILER ET AL., supra note 94, at fil-·m 
�)6. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, Mt:.OIC.·\1. �IALI'R.·\r.TICF.: THEORY, [\1DE�CE, -\�0 Pt:BLI<: 
I'Ol.ICY 38 ( 1985) (reponing that .. plaimiffs 1,·uu in only cwenr.y-eight percent" of medical 
malpractice cases rried to verdict). 
97. St'e Frank A. Sloan, Experience Ra1111g. Uti•'' 11 Makl' Sense for Medzral fvlalpractia Jnsumnce?, 
-\\I. Ec:o�. RE\' .. Mar 1990. at 128. Experienct· r.uing is the practice of basing fuwre preminms 
in pan on the claims history of individual in::.ur..-cl.;. 
�IX. See Baker. Blood Monry. sujJm note R::!. m '177. 
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create a favorable record in the- event of a lawsu il.�1 Thus, the medical 
malprac tice arena suggests that u ncntainty can be a "force multipl i er" and 
therefore a potemially useful tOol in deterring harm, particularly i n  
ituations in which i t  i s  difficult to increase significantly the average 
probability of detection. 
Environmental enforcement also exploits the deterrent effects of 
uncertainty, though with exactly the opposite combination of cer·taimy and 
uncertai nty in sanctioning and dett'ction. Because of the extensive record 
keeping and manifest system impnsl"d b the Resource Conse1vation and 
Recovery Act ( RCRA), hazar·dou was res are easily tr·aced back to their 
source.wu lf we think of produci ng the ha7.ardous waste as the ·'wrong," then 
the detection of that wrong is virntally cenain for businesses that operate 
\·vithin rhe law.1111 'What is radical ly uncertain, however, is the sanct ion for 
1hat wrong. The sanction could bt> as small as the addi tional costs of using 
EPA-approved disposal service)), or as great as the costs of cleaning up a 
f uture waste si re using a very expensivt", not-yet-discovered technology. w:z 
C Sl ',\JMAIH' 
From this brief analysis Wt" reach the following conclusions. First, 
criminal law has a strong, well-esrablished aspi ratio n , embedded in docrri ne. 
that sanctions should be known in advance. A similar, although perhaps less 
strongly held, aspiration can also bt> round in tort lav.-. 
Second, despite this aspiration for cerr ai nry in sanctioning, th ere are 
ways to manipulate uncertainty. For example. i n  Clirninal law-the legal field 
in \vhich certainty may be most rlwrished-certainL)1 in anctioning could be 
manipulated by rejeCL ing the sen u.:ncing guidel ines or by i mroducing a 
larger range of pe rmissible sanctions i n  t h e  exist i ng st>ntencing guideli nes. 
Al ternatively, uncertainty could be created by reduci ng rhe penalties for 
attempted (but not completed) rri me , or by borrowing from the victin'"l­
centered approach or tort law and i ncreasing the penalties for completed 
c1·imes that cause greater harms. l n  addition, prosecutors could borrow 
Rudolph Guliani "s semen(" ing lotlerv idea and apply it to decisions to charge 
up or down, or w decision about \\'hat kinds of plea bargains to entertain. 
In ton law, unce rtai nly cotdd be increased tl1 rough efforts di rened at 
99. .'in• Patricia Danzon. l.wbif/1, for ,\l,•rilcflf Mofjn·nrllrf'. 111 I HA!'DUOOK c H l-Ib\ I Til 
1-.1 o--:mucs � ��9 (2000). 
lOll. .'in· 42 l" .S.C. ::i� lilJ91 -t1�1!l�k t:lOOt iJ . 
l l J l .  O f  nmrst'. RCRA dot� no1 �·xplu 1 1 h  franw hatarrlou� w:-bt<' procluc1iun a' . 1  -wr•)ng'" 
''"�" dol'" tl lraJHl' the ro'\L' of ''ast•· dispo,:tl .1� a "sannum.'" \o\"l· do. howt'\t'J". Ill ordt>r to 
d<"lllonstr:.stt· thai t lwrt> arc "real hk'" �uuatJon� 1ha1 arl' analogoJJ� ro tht' ca�.- 111 ,,·hich 
det,·nion •� C<'rtain hut dw �ann1o11 IS radit alh unct>nain. 
I 0�. ( :ER< :Lr\ impo�<·, joint ,ltld 't'\"t>r;ll JJabilily 011 grnenuor� ;mel tran�pon�rs of ,,.:l,ll'�. ,\� 
1\t•ll a� on nwnc>r" <11 'lit"' in 1\"llich ,,·a!lt.-� an· <kpnsitt'd. Sr••· 4� l' '-i.C. �� 9!illl-�l67·1 (�000). 
< .Cimph.lnt't• ,,i t l t  gn�t'rtlllh'!ll n·gul,11inn� n·g-:trding di�p'>�al of han1dous 1\.-I�IC' i' 11• 11 a 
dd,·nst• ' " a  CERCI .:\ .H lion /d. � \)ti07 
[ �ll0-1 1 
JTdJJcing th� d<unpening ellen of li<lbilit' i11surance or hv efforts din·ncd at 
inrrea ing ri le significal lCt' of· th� it-s:- prcdictahlc aspc·cb of l<ll "l  dalllages. 
such as noJH.:conornic or punit iH' damages as wt'll as joint and se,·eral 
lial>ilir�.  
vVhether in the end sllch ddibcrme artempts to manipulate uncenainry 
ought w he encouraged in t i l e  face of the aspinllion for ccnai n ry is of 
course an irnponant questio11, one to whic:h Wt' do not propose· an <ll l<>wcr. 
vVe propose more modestly rhar. the potential deterrence effects of 
unccrrai n ty should he investigated and cort"'i clerecl-a process that does not 
seem w have occurred in the COJltCXl of the heated debate in the 1 970s and 
19ROs over . entencin.g guidelines or in the context of the contemporary 
heated dehate concerning punitive damages. 
Third. while crirni11al and wrT law em body a strong aspiration for 
certain[)' i n  sanctioning, they do not appear to have the same aspiration for 
certainty regarding the probabi lity of detection. This absence is perhaps 
stronger in wrt law than criminal law because ton law enforcement depends 
to a greater extent on 1 h e  decisions of uncoordinated private plaintiffs, 
rarher than (at least potentially) coordinated government agencies. 
Fou nh, given the lack of consistenl, principled objection to uncenaimy 
in detection, delibcratelv manipulating that uncertainty ought tO be rnore 
acceptable. Thus, if uncertaintv in fact promotes deterrrnce. the 
indifference of tort and criminal Ll\v w this particular kind of uncertainty 
may present an opportunity. Of course. there may be situations in which the 
probability of deteCLion is al readr -;o uncenain that del iberate eflons LO 
increase the uncertain ty will have litrle or no effect. Nevenhelc s, it seems 
likely that there are other sitmuions in which the probabi lity of detection is 
not as uncertain and, therefore, the potential benefits o f  short term, 
intensive enforcement campaigns should be considered. Bringing public 
anention to the relatively high probabi lity of detection during these 
campaigns, while withholding i n formation about their location and 
duration, could have the effen of exj.>anding the range of uncertainty 
regarding the probability of detection. 
Finally, this reference to puhlic attention has an additional imponanr 
implication. Even if other co11sickrations such as fairness (for example, i n  
the context o f  t h e  cenainry o f  rhe criminal sanction) o r  practical l imi1s on 
the ability of enforcement agencit:s w detect wrongdoing (in the romext of 
the certai n ty with respect to the prohahil ity of detection) dictate legal rules 
and institutional procedures. it is still the case that certainty or uncenainty 
could be manipulated to enhance dererrence. This is because it i not 
certainty or uncertainty per se that produces the deterrent effecL<; of the 
legal system ,  but rather belief.s concerning certainty or uncertainty. Thu:., by 
highlighting existing uncen.ainry-producing aspects of the system (which 
presumably exist for practical or othe1- reasons and are not manufactu red in 
order to increase deterrence). the legal system could enhance deterrence. 
TI-11:· \ 'JRHJl-:) OF UNCJ:;RTAf]\lfY IN !-'"\ IV 4R I 
For t>xample, if juries have discretion o,·er the size of punitive damages 
because of a commitment to democrarjc ideals, emphasizing the resulling 
nncenainty could appropriately and fairly be used to promote deterrence, 
<:>ven if i t  V<'Otdd be immoral to delibrrately introduce the same level of 
unct>rlaint)' into puniti,·e damages olely on deterrence grounds. 
IV. O�]ECTIONS 
There are at least five significant objections to the suggestion that 
certainty should be manipulated to in crease deteiTence: ( 1 )  Manipul.ation of 
certainty is immoral; (2) Manipulatjon of cerlainty is costly; (�) 
Manipulation of certainty is not effective; (4) Manipulation of cerlainry is 
inefficient because i t  may lead to over/under-deterrence; and (!'>) 
.Manipulation of certainty ma)' have unpredictable consequences because 
subpopulations differ in their aversion to risk. We address each in turn. 
A. MORAl. CONSllJERA "J'JONS 
J t  could be argued that manipulating certai !ll)', either wiLh respect to 
the- ize of the sanction or· with respect to the probability of detection, is 
inherently wrong. lL may be wrong because uncertainty i t  elf is wrong or, 
even if unce-rrainty is not inherently wrong, creating uncertainty deliberarely 
in order to increase deterrence may be wrong. The relunanct> to manipulate 
certainty fot· the sake of increasing deterrence may be fOtmdecl on one of 
t\\'0 moral explanations. It  may, for instance, rest on the i n t u i tion that such 
an uncertain!)' involves differential tr<:>aunent or people who are similarly 
situated and therefore violates principles of eguality. m1 Alternatively, ir may 
re t on the belief that the size of the sanction should reflect the degree of 
wrong committed and, ronsequentJv. that pe-oplt> who commit the same 
wrongs should be treated in the same '''ay. w 1  Tlw. e two moraJ intuitions are 
distinct. 111" The first is grounded in the ideal of <�q uality, while t h e  second is 
grounded in retributivejustice. 
These 1noral intuirions seem particularly compelling when incJi,iduals 
'''ho committed an identical wrong unrlt>r idemical circumstances receive 
cliffe-re•nt sanctions ba ed on a system deliberately smtctured to promote 
uncertainty. These i ntuitions seem less \ompelling, however, 1 n  
I l l:�. Oisp;tril\ in sentencnt� i;. oltcn CDtHicmtwrl a"��  "m;mif<",t lorm o l  inj11stice. \\'hich m:n-
hrin!-( :1 S<'tllt'llcing svstem IIH<l publi< dist·t']>lllc·." \�h,,·onh. wfJm nnlt' 2. <II 2:�<i. Ollwr�. 
hm,·c·,·er. lwl ien· 1l 1a 1 disparilv in ,....-ntcncing < a11 lw .i us1 ified . . \1'1· 1'\0R\'AI. 1\1 ORRIS. MAD:-\t:SS ·\i\'1> 
I I  IF ( .�1�1 1:-.:\l LA\\ 1 79-80 (I��!-\�). For a di,cus,..l<>ll of 1lw imponanc<' of COthtdcring f:1inws" 
and cquali11 111 1 riminal bw. , ... t' A Inn Hard & (;idt'oll Parchomm-sk\ .  On Hall' rmd 1-:qunllty. Hl!l 
\'.\1.1- LJ. :l07 C I !l9�). 
I 04. Thc- ptlnnplt- ol ··prop<" II• lllah 11  :· '' hen·h1 'a' 11 t1ons 'hnuld be propoJ 111 >lltllt' 111 1 heir 
St'l·t·ritl 1o tht' gravil1· ol Llw ofl,·ncPs. is re�ard<·d a� ,, b;�sic requirenlPnt ol justice. For a 
phtlosopl11ral justificalloll of thi" pnnciplt' Ill· on..- ol II:< mos1 lm·al advocate's. �CT A:-<DRE\\ \·n:-. 
I I IRt;< II .  CE:-\�1 Rl " !) SA:-\< 1 10!'-'> ti-19 ( l !l!Ul. 
I o:.. \/I·Y )'>!· I'll R \l. TH� .\Il l!{ \I.IIY Ul F�l·.l· i)C l\1 1 1 7-4-1 ( 19:-\!i). 
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circumstance:-; 111 whit h tht· di.;;pariry i a bvproduct of a legal systt'lll that 
aurhorize · legal deci ion makers lO weigh numerous !-actor<:. and make a 
decision on the basis of an o\·erall judgment of the culpabiliry or 
wrongfulness of rhe rele\·arn behavior. In other words, there seems to be a 
substantial difference between (a) a sentence that ranges between five and 
Len years determined by the nip of a dice; and (b) a sentence that range 
between five and Len years according co the discretion of a judge. 
AJthough both S)'Stems lead to uncertainty, the former system violates a 
sen ·e of justice because it ic; de ignecl lO bring about uncertainty and 
because i t  also introduces playfulness into the process in which people's fate 
is determined-a proces which is perceived to be one of seriou 
deliberation. The lattt'r system leads to uncertain ty, but iL is not designed to 
bring about disparicy in sanctioning; the disparity is simply an unintentional 
byproduct of a .cherne designed to take seriously the particularities of each 
case. These particularities are so complex that they i nevitabl lead to 
uncertainty even if this disparity is grounded in relevant differences bet\veen 
the different cases. 
This raises the possibility that existing uncertainty, which is justified on 
other ground , could be emphasized or publicized in order to i11crease 
deterrence. without violating moral concerns about deliberately increasing 
uncertainty. Some purists may resist this conclusion, however. arguing that, 
although certainty brought about unintentionally may be legitimate, 
uncertainty may never be used to promote deterrence. ln r h i  · view. 
uncertainty could be maintained without violating our sense ofjustice, only 
if it is not intentionally used to promote deterrence, but is designed for 
I I 
. . ]fl(; ot 1er egtumate purposes. 
Thi · concern for cenaimy seems more compelling with re. peer to the 
size of the criminal or civil sanction than i t  is with respect to the probabiliry 
of detection. Consequemly, even if one believes that a system which imposes 
uncertain sanctions is morally abhorrent, one can still approve of generating 
uncertainty with respect to the probability of cletecrion for the ake of 
promoting deterrence. 
Last, it is perhaps worth emphasizing that the ideal of equal sanctions 
for equal wrongs is nol as entrenched as it may seem. lu his rnniculous 
analysis of legal sanctions, Bentham has argued that: ''The last ol�ect [of 
I Oo. Admiuedl}'. however. [he Iauer system, in which uncertainty is not dt'�igned to 
c:-nh<tnce deterrence may have less deterrent effects. This is because if the sanction depends on 
the discretional)' powers of a judgt-. the oflcndcr may believe he can innuence the us�: of this 
discretion. The proce.� set>ms It'� .t.rbi t rarv and thus more certain than the arhirrary toss of a 
coin . Arguahly. therefore. introducing arbitrariltt'ss in sanctioning prest'nrs tht: polic�· maker 
with the following dilemma: Eitht:r uncertainLy is introduced in a way which is hlatanilv unjus1 
{such as by tossing a coin), or i t  is introduced in legi t imate ways which have k:-�Pr cktcrrent 
ellecL� because they art' pc:-rcci\·ed lO be:- les� arbitrary. We arc grateful to Beth<�m· lkrg<:r for 
raising this point. 
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criminal law] is, whatever mischief is guarded against, to guard against it at 
a cheap a rate as possible: therefore the punishment ought in no case to be 
nwre than what is necessary r.o bring it intO conformity with the rules here 
given." 10; I n  contemporary literature, this principle has been labeled the 
principle of parsimony. The principle of parsimony often overrides the 
principle of equality. 1013 If, by manipulating certainty, the legal system can 
t-educe the average size of the sanction. it follows the dictates of the 
principk of parsimony-a central principle enu-enched m the 
contemporary legal system. 
B. CosT 
One could argue that the manipulation of certainty may have its own 
costs. It is possible, for instance, that conducting enforcement campaigns is 
more costly than maintaining a constant degree of enforcemenL If the costs 
of manipulating certainty (eitJ1er incn�asing o r  decreasing it) are high, these 
costs may override the deterrence-based benefits of such a manipulation. 
ome methods of m�nipulating cenainty could be costJy. Yet, other methods 
are not. An examination of rhe overall cost and benefits of manipulating 
certainty can be made only after a more rhorough investigation of the effects 
of uncenainty on deterrence. This i precisely what our expnimem is 
designed tO do. 
C. EH-H.TII -r:s�::ss 
I t  may be argued that ccnainty with re. pect to the size> of d1e anction 
or with respect to the probabiliry of detection are such marginal factors i n  
the decision t o  violate a legal norm that policie targeted at uncertainty will 
not be effective. This i neffectivenes. objection may be based on an intui tive 
sense that actors operate on the basis of the expected value of 1 heir action 
and, thus, certainty plays little role in their calculations. This ol?jenion is 
exactly what our expetiment is designed w test. 
Alrernative.ly, the ineffecti\'eness o�jection may be based on the 
conviction that the deteClion or criminal or tonious behavior is already so 
highly uncertain that the effects of manipulating certainty furrht>r for the 
ake or increasing deterrc:>11ce cfln at most be margi nal.  This is perhaps the 
most powerful objection ro the analy is providc.>d in this Article. 
Nevertheless, even wirb regard to case� in which detection is al ready so 
uncertain. the analysis is thi Anicle ·uggesL<; that there ma� be law 
enforct>ment benefits to b<" gained bv highlighting rhis uncertainty in or<in 
ro reap its deterrence benefits. Moreover, rhere undoubtedly are 
circumsll\llce>s in which tht> probability of <ietection at least appears If's · 
I 07. jERF \I\ B� :" 1 1 1:\\1. !\'\ 1:--, I ROD I .(  I l l  1'\ I 0 ·1 1 1  E PRJ 'i< .IPI.�-., n� :vi ORAL<; \'-II l.Ft .lSI_\ 1"10:" 
1 ()9 ( 1970). 
10� s,,,, Mnn i,. 111jn11 1101•· :.:!:� • .  11 1?'\:l 
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uncertain: such as violmiuns of parking r·t-gtdations. traffic oflen�e:-s. ta:-.: 
crim<:-�. llccdth and safety regulations. and the like. 
In 1 ht" end, thi ol�jection. although ,·cry important, requires detailed 
empirical research that is beyond the linritt"d scope of our project. Whether 
it is worth conducting that research turns. in igniftcanr parr., o n  whether 
uucertaitlt\ can ha\'t' a deterrent effect. For· that question our experimenr 
. I I b . . f' 10'' provt< es L H' egtntHngs o an answer. 
!t is �ometime-s argued thal. ir. sanction are otherwise set optimal! . 
then uncertainty can cause irlefl-icient (}\'t"r-(otnpl iance. 1 1 1 1  rr uncertainty in 
fact increases the deterrent eff'ecr.s of orne criminal or civil ·anctions. rlten 
i ncrea. i ng uncertainty would increase the costs associated with comtnining 
the crime or wrong. Given the (heroic) assu mption that a particular 
sanction i · othenvise set optimally, i ncreasing uncertainty would lead to 
over-de terrence. On the other hand, \vith at least some combinations of 
average si1.e o f  sanction and average probabi lity of detection, increasing 
uncenaint�' beyond a n:·rtain point may reduce deterrence t h rough a 
re·punse that may be similar to that of "learned helplessness" (the term i n  
the psychological l i terature for t h e  apathy that results when punishments do 
not appear to be related to behavior) . 1 1 1  Thus, depending o n  th<" 
circumstances, increasing uncertainty could lead to over- or un<ier­
deterrence. 
While sig11ificant, these concerns do nor undercut our analysis. Incleecl. 
they support our effort to investigate the deterrent effects of uncertainty. l f  
uncertainty i n  fan increases deterrence, rl re11  increasing uncertainty may be 
a cost-effective way w increase deterrence in situations in which there is 
reason w believe the ex,sung level of detetTence is not optimal. 
Alternatively, i f  existing sanction ·  are optimal, policymakers may be able to 
reduce the costs of deterrence by reducing the average sanction and 
increasing uncertaint:y (leading to, for example, lower incarceration costs in 
the criminal con[ext and maller average punitive damages a ... ,,ards in the 
civil con text). 
l 09. :\ tina!, less substamial. inetfectivcnc-�� o�jertion applies on!)' to repeat pi avers in 
enf'orcerJWI1[ games. This objection a�sen.s thal increasing uncertai ntY in individual roun(b nf 
the ga111t- ,,·ill nul change the behavior of pc::vple wltu plav ofLen enough so thac Lht·ir san<..Lil>�h 
art: based PII the average probability of c lelection . lr true. this objection would dcmonstratl' dw 
tlc::tern:llt p()wt:r of uuct:rtainty, bt:cause Lhe rept"at players would be making decisions frun1 the 
pcrspcniH· of certaimy. rathe•· than unrenai11rv. The:- quimessential repeal plaH:r� i11 
enforccnwnt games arc liahilit} insurance comp:lllics. 
I I 0 .),.,.Calfee & C:raswell, supm tautt: I 6. ar 9(i5. 
I l l . St•P LEKORE £. WALKER, TilE 13A ITI:.R£D \\'0\I.\N SY:'-/DROMF. 10-11 (2d eel. 2000) (11:>111g 
the concept ot learned helplessness w explain the:: banerecl woman svndrome). Sn• ,!!.'I'IIPmllv 
Marnn Seligman el a!.. Alle-viation of Leamnl fiPlflll's,nt>�' in thr Dog. 73 J. ABNOR"I.-\L P�'YC :HOL. �l:>l) 
( l �lil'i ) . 
'filE VTH.TUES OF UNCER'FAIJ\'T}' /N !.A W 485 
Polinsky and Sbavell have argued that over-deterrence is particularly 
l ikely to result f1·om unccnaimy concerning the amount of th<" sanction 
bt"ca11se of the risk bearing cost borne whenever the sanctjon is set higher 
than 1 he external costs of the act.iviry rhat the sanction is i mended to 
discourage. 1 1 �  The intuition here is that within the economic analysis of law. 
the optimal (objective) expected value of a sanction should be set so that i t  
matches the external costs that the activity imposes on society. and that at  
an)' time a potential sanction is  higher than that amount, the people who 
.. sl1ould'' engage i n  that activity (because their private gains from the activity 
\_·xcced the external costs) will be subject to the 1isk that they will have to pay 
a sanction that exceeds the optimal sanction. Because of risk aversion, the 
risk of a larger sanction will lead individuals to assign a subjecti\·e <"Xpected 
\'alut" to the sanction that will exceed the objective expected value of that 
same- sanction. At the margin, some people who "should" engage in the 
activit:)' will not, and all people who do engage in the activity will bear a 
higher risk than they "should." For this reason, Polinsky and Shavell 
conclude that, subject to the cosL'i of enforcement, it is mor(' t"fficient Lo 
increase detCJTellCC by i ncreasing the probabiJ i!:)1 Of detection than by 
. . I . f I 
. 
, , .� mcreas1ng 1 H� s1ze o t 1e sanct1on. 
Although this concern is also significant, it doe not undercm our 
analysis. I nstead, i t  suggests that in some circumstances there art' comp<."Ling 
considerations in favor of reducing certain kinds of uncertainry. Moreover, 
'"�thin their theoretical framework our analysis adds an additional tool to 
i J tcrea::.e deterrenct' that can be traded off again t sanction size. namely . d . I 1 I · 1 ·  f d  . 1 14 t1ncena111ty regar. mg t 1e pro Ja Jl ny o etecuon. 
The final ol�jection is one that is not in fact addressed by our 
L'xperiment. This is the objection that i ncreasing uncertainty may ha\'e 
nnpredictable results due to systematic variaLions in the risk aversion of 
subpopulations. For exampk. there is res<"arch that suggests that p<·ople in 
prisons are ignificantly less risk-av<:-rse nn a\·erage-and mort' likely to be­
risk-seeking-rhan undergracluatc sntclt'nLs ,,·ho t) pically participate in 
bl'havioral decision research experiments. ' "  Thus. if  we wall! to deter at 
I I �. .'il'l' Polin�\..� & Sh,l\dl. .111jno tto1�· :i, ,11 :-il·HJ-� 1 . 
I I � !d. ,u RXI. HX-1-H:•; Jt't' it/ . . 11 x:·q lt'xpbitllttg 1h.11 "Lh�· 11:-t· t1l ,t �111alk1 prob,tiHlir' and :1 
l tighc:t line: 111:\\' ltll\'t'l tni l it) dtw 1 1 1  n�k be:.�ring .tnd mort· th,\11 ulht•t tlw bcndit.' from 
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least some !<._incl. of serio11.S criminal acti' i tv, increasing uncerrainty might be 
coumer-producti,·e. Similarly, Lher<: i. research uggesting that the nw�t 
safety-conscious and law abiding people might also be the most ri k-averse.1 1" 
As a result, increasing uncertainty could in SOITle circumstances have the 
perverse result of over-deterring those who are already complying with legal 
norms while increasing the under-deterrence problem among those who are 
alreaclv more casual about complying with legal norms. 
It is vety imponanr to note. however, that this objection can also be 
rai ed with regard w efforts to increase deterrence u ing the more 
traditional tools of sanction size and probability. Thus, this objection is not 
unique to efforts to use uncertainty w increase deterrence. Accordingly, 
although variations in aversion w uncertainty are importanr and worthy of 
funher investigation, that investigation is worth pursuing only if one is lirst 
persuaded of the potemial deterrent effects of uncertainty. That. of course, 
was Lhe primary object of Lhis research .  
V .  CONCLUS£0t 
Traditionally. legal scholarship i n  criminal law and i n  ton law has 
focused attention on the amount of and the procedure for determining 
sanctions. Law and economics analysis expanded that traditional focus by 
demonstrating the importance of considering the probability of detection 
and risk aversion. As that analysis has demonstrated, it is the exfJPcled wnction 
[hat matters, not the absolute size of the sanction. Indeed, higher sanctions 
could in some circumstances lead to a lower probability of detection, with a 
re ulting decrease i n  deterrence, and vice versa. 
Using the insights of behavioral decision research, this Article has 
emphasized yet another factor that affectS the deterrence value of ci,·il ,tnd 
criminals are risk-averse wi1.h regard Ln impri�onmenl and 1.ha1.. as a resull. detcrmincnc 
setllt:nci ng increases crime), available at hnp:/ /papers.ssrn.com/soi�Vdclivery.cfm/ 
S R'<_l D37042 1_code03021 0500.pcll7abslractid=37042 l .  See gmemlly :VIIchael K. Block & 
Vt�rnon E. (.;erery, Some 1�·xpenme11Ull l�·vulence 011 !Jif nences Betwem Studml and Pnsoner R('(/flitlll' to 
.Holll't(/Jy PenalliP., ami Risk, 24 J. LECAt STL·o. 123 ( 1995). 
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criminal sannions. I t  is not only the expected sanction that counts, but also 
the certainty with which that expected sanction can be known in t h e  
individual case. Varying the certainty of the size o f  t h e  sanction o r  of the 
probability that it will be imposed also affects the deterrence value of thf' 
sanctioning system .  
T h e  conclusions drawn from our research and analysis are l i kely to 
depend, at least in part, on perspective. Staunch believers in law and 
economics may conclude that legal thinkers should rethink their traditional 
hostility tOwards uncertainty. Other legal scholars may conclude that this 
Article provides yet another demonstrarjon that legal institutions do not rest 
on economic rationales. Perhaps the most reasonable conclusion ro draw, 
however, is that i n  contexts that do not raise serious concerns of injustice 
and unfairness. uncertainty could indeed be manipulated in orde1· to 
i ncrease deteJTence without compromising the ideals underlying legal 
institutions. 
